Seminars , Courses and Events Quantitative Economics

MLSE Seminars

MLSE is a (mostly) bi-weekly seminar to foster cooperation between the Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics and the Department of Quantitative Economics. It aims to give researchers the opportunity to present their ongoing work and to facilitate cooperation

Website of MLSE https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/mlse-seminar

In case you want to follow the seminar online, please let us know. Also let us know whenever you know people that would like to receive these emails.

If you would like to present in this seminar series, please send an email to either @Bodicky, Michal (ALGEC) or @Triêu, Anh (KE).

Date and time: 18 November 18, 13:15-14:15 

Author: Jean-Jacques Herings, Christian Seel, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Room A1.22

Title: Random networks

Abstract: Akin to the literature on random games, we analyze pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) for two models of socioeconomic networks in which the utilities of each individual are drawn at random. In the case of network-dependent utilities, the utility is drawn at random for each possible network, whereas in the case of neighbor-dependent utilities, the utility is required to be the same whenever the individual has the same set of links.

For each model, as the network gets large, the probability that at least one pairwise stable network exists approaches one, but the expected fraction of pairwise stable networks approaches zero. We also obtain lower and upper bounds on the expected number of pairwise stable networks as the network gets large. For the case of network-dependent utilities, we provide additional results on the distribution of pairwise stable networks.

 

Go to Archive Seminar s and Workshops QE

 

QE Seminars Programme 2025 Autumn - Winter

Wednesday 12 November 12:30-13:30.

Room TS 53 A1.22

Speaker: Xuanzhu Jin

Title: Competitive Facility Location Games with Congestion Effects

Abstract: We consider a competitive facility location game in a market with finitely many firms and a unit mass of consumers. First, firms simultaneously choose where to set up a facility, with the objective of attracting as many consumers as possible. Second, based on the firms’ location strategy profile, consumers travel to a firm’s location, with the aim of minimizing their own travel cost. We start with two firms and prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) by introducing a binary relation over the set of locations. For finitely many firms, we show that every instance of the competitive location game with linear travel cost functions admits a PNE and the price of anarchy equals 2. In contrast, when extending the analysis to cases with affine cost functions, a PNE may not exist.

Wednesday 19 November 12:30-13:30.

Room TS 53 A1.22

Speaker: Yordi van Kruchten

Title:

Optimizing Capacity Management for the Treatment Daycare Center for Oncology and Hematology: From Thesis Research to Practical Application

Abstract:

This seminar will present the development of a heuristic scheduling framework for the Treatment Daycare Center for Oncology and Hematology at Maastricht UMC+ (MUMC+), from the initial research phase to its ongoing application in practice. The primary goal of the research was to design an efficient scheduling template that optimizes chair allocation and nurse workload. However, before full implementation, efforts are focused on reducing variability at the front-end of the process to ensure smoother operations. This work involves aligning patient inflow from outpatient clinics with available treatment capacity, thus minimizing inefficiencies.

The talk will outline the methodological approach, including clustering, optimization techniques such as Variable Neighborhood Search (VNS), and simulation-based evaluations. Furthermore, I will discuss the ongoing work on real-time data visualizations in Power BI, which are being used to enhance decision-making and capacity planning at the center. The seminar will conclude with an overview of future steps, including the implementation of the template scheduling, once the current variability reduction efforts and other planned improvements are completed.

This presentation will be of interest to students and faculty involved in operations research, healthcare optimization, and data-driven decision-making.

Wednesday 26 November  12:30-13:30.

Room TS 53 A1.22

Speaker: Philipp Ketz

Title: Numerical analysis of test optimality

Abstract: In many testing problems, size control and implementability are primary concerns. As a result, researchers often rely on ad hoc tests—without known optimality properties a priori. Yet, it remains of interest whether a given ad hoc test is optimal in some sense.

The standard practice compares the power curve of the ad hoc test with a power envelope constructed as a sequence of point-optimal tests, but this comparison is inconclusive when a gap exists between the two: either the ad hoc test is inadmissible or the power envelope is unattainable by a single test. We propose an approximate power envelope based on a single test, which enables a conclusive numerical assessment of admissibility. We construct our approximate power envelope for the CLR test of Moreira (2003) in the linear IV model with fixed true parameters under distant null hypotheses. The test is found to be numerically admissible, revising the less optimistic conclusion of Andrews, Marmer, and Yu (2019), which was based on the pointwise power envelope of Andrews, Moreira, and Stock (2006).

 

Schedule Overview:

  • 10/09: Marc Schröder (Maastricht University)
  • 17/09: Garth Tarr (The University of Sydney)
  • 24/09: Tom Demeulemeester (Maastricht University)
  • 1/10: Daniele Girolimetto (University of Padova)
  • 8/10: Dries Vermeulen (Maastricht University)
  • 15/10: Frits Spieksma (TU Eindhoven)
  • 22/10: Ties Bos (QE), Jip de Kok (MUMC+), Frank van Rosmalen (MUMC+
  • 29/10: Shahrezad Fahmy  (Maastricht University)
  • 5/11:  Etienne Wijler (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
  • 12/11: Xuanzhu Jin  (Maastricht University)
  • 19/11: Yordi van Kruchten and Flip van Kasteren (MUMC+)
  • 26/11: Philipp Ketz (Paris School of Economics)
  • 3/12: Stijn Vansteelandt (Ghent University)
  • 10/12: Heiko Röglin (University of Bonn)
  • 17/12: TBA

Go to Archive Seminars and Workshops QE

EPICENTER Summer Course on Epistemic Game Theory