Faculty of Law

These last few weeks, Minister Paul of Social Affairs and Employment of the outgoing cabinet has been in the news for unilaterally deciding no longer to gradually phase out the Dutch regulation that allows temporary employment agencies to deduct a quarter of the minimum wage from migrant workers salaries in exchange for housing. That regulation would decrease by 5 percent starting January 1st, reaching 0 percent by New Year's Day 2030. Paul's predecessor, Van Hijum, intended to introduce this legislation to combat human trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation involving temporary employment agencies by making migrant workers less dependent onthem. Human traffickers often make migrant workers and other vulnerable populations multiply dependent on them by requiring them not only to work for them but also be housed by them. Once a worker loses their job, they no longer have a place to stay overnight.

On 27 November 2025, the tenth edition of the workshop series on Ius Commune in the Making took place within the 29^th Ius Commune Conference organised by the University of Amsterdam. This blog entry reproduces a public address by one of the members of the organising committee of that workshop series.

Imagine two companies from different countries enter a business deal. They pick a neutral country’s law to govern their contract and agree to arbitrate any disputes, thinking they can sidestep each other’s national courts. But what if one country’s law absolutely prohibits something in the deal – say, paying bribes, or trading with a sanctioned nation? Laws like these are called overriding mandatory rules, and they can trump the chosen law of the contract. In international commercial arbitration, where private arbitrators (not courts) decide disputes, such must-obey laws pose a unique challenge. How can arbitrators respect these important laws without undermining the freedom of businesses to choose their own rules? This question is at the heart of my research on overriding mandatory rules in international commercial arbitration.

According to classic economic thinking—and to common sense—if two parties agree to a deal, both are made better off, otherwise they would not have agreed. This idea is also reflected in contract law, at least in its basic form, treats consent as the cornerstone of a valid contract. If both sides say ‘yes,’ the law usually upholds the deal.

But matters are not that simple. Consumer protection laws, for instance, recognise situations where one party needs special safeguards. And everyone accepts that consent at gunpoint—think of the mobster line, ‘Your signature, or your brains on the contract’—is not real consent. The harder question is why coercion invalidates consent, and even what “consent” really means. In my thesis, I address both questions. Contrary to much of the existing scholarship, which treats the distinction between free and coerced consent as a social construct, I argue that the difference is factual and can be identified objectively.

When we speak of corporations, we usually think of shareholders and managers: the former provide capital, the latter make decisions. Yet, without the contributions of its employees, no corporation can survive, let alone thrive. In my PhD thesis, I answered the question of how employee participation has been developing and structured over time in China, and what effects it has had on employees and on firm performance. I also compared employee participation in China and Germany. In this blog, I want to focus on the importance of employee participation and what insights China and Germany can provide.