Before the World Court: What Is at Stake in the Advisory Proceedings on Israel’s Obligations in Relation to the United Nations and Other Actors in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

From Monday, 28 April to Friday, 2 May 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will hold public hearings on the most recent request for an advisory opinion by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) concerning the situation in Palestine. On 19 December 2024, the UNGA adopted Resolution 79/232, requesting the ICJ, “on a priority basis and with the utmost urgency”, to clarify Israel’s obligations under international law in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations, and third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The request comes at a time of acute humanitarian crisis and heightened scrutiny of Israeli measures affecting international actors in the OPT, particularly in Gaza.

Since the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks by Hamas, Israel has launched a full-scale military campaign in Gaza, during which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have destroyed numerous facilities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and more than 200 UNRWA staff members have been killed. The UNGA established UNRWA in 1949 with a mandate to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to registered Palestine refugees in the Agency’s area of operations pending a just and lasting solution to their plight. According to Philippe Lazzarini, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, since October 2023, the agency has delivered two-thirds of all food assistance and provided shelter to over one million displaced persons in Gaza.

Allegations concerning UNRWA’s neutrality became a key factor in the lead-up to Resolution 79/232. In January 2024, Israel alleged that some UNRWA staff had participated in the 7 October attacks, prompting 16 States to suspend or pause funding, totaling approximately US$450 millions. In response, the UN Secretary-General appointed an Independent Review Group to assess UNRWA’s neutrality framework. The resulting Colonna Report, released on 20 April 2024, concluded that Israel had not provided evidence to support its broader claims that many UNRWA employees were affiliated with terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, UNRWA dismissed nine staff members. Subsequently, on 28 October 2024, the Israeli Knesset passed legislation banning UNRWA from operating within Israel and occupied East Jerusalem, accusing the agency of colluding with Hamas.

It was this legislation—perceived as a direct attack on the United Nations’ humanitarian presence—that prompted Norway, together with a group of States, to lobby the General Assembly to submit a request to the International Court of Justice. In presenting Resolution 79/232, Norway emphasized the urgency of the situation, stating: “For international law to remain credible, for the most basic humanitarian principles to be upheld, we must act.” The resolution, Norway explained, aims to “protect and preserve the humanitarian operations of the United Nations, of humanitarian organizations and of third States in the occupied Palestinian territory.” In particular, Norway expressed deep concern over the legislation’s impact on UNRWA, warning that its implementation “will, if implemented, effectively end UNRWA’s operations in the occupied Palestinian territory,” which in turn “would collapse the United Nations humanitarian response.  It would also have dire implications for the United Nations humanitarian efforts — and its privileges and immunities — beyond the present situation”.

Background to the Request

Resolution 79/232 was adopted with 137 votes in favour, 12 against, and 22 abstentions. These states voted against the resolution: Argentina, Czechia, Fiji, Hungary, Israel, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Tonga, and the United States of America.

According to Article 18(2) of the UN Charter, decisions on “important questions” in the General Assembly—such as requests for advisory opinions—must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. In this case, 149 states cast a vote (137 in favour and 12 against), meaning that 100 affirmative votes were needed for adoption. The resolution easily passed with a substantial margin, underscoring the depth of international concern and support for submitting the legal question to the Court. 

What Is the Court Being Asked?

The Court has been asked “on a priority basis and with the utmost urgency” to render an advisory opinion on the following question:

“What are the obligations of Israel, as an occupying Power and as a member of the United Nations, in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, including its agencies and bodies, other international organizations and third States, in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including to ensure and facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population as well as of basic services and humanitarian and development assistance, for the benefit of the Palestinian civilian population, and in support of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination?”

This question must be read in light of the factual and legal context that informed the General Assembly’s request. Some of this context can be drawn from the preambular paragraphs of the resolution, which reflect the broader concerns expressed by the General Assembly and the developments that prompted the request.

The resolution also identifies the legal framework the Court is invited to consider in responding to the question. This includes:

• the Charter of the United Nations,
• international humanitarian law,
• international human rights law,
• the privileges and immunities of international organizations and States under international law,
• relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Human Rights Council,
• as well as the Court’s advisory opinions of 9 July 2004 and 19 July 2024.

The request for advisory opinion did not come out of nowhere. The latest request marks another chapter in the Palestinian story before the ICJ. The Occupied Palestinian Territory has previously been the subject of two advisory opinions, delivered by the Court almost exactly twenty years apart.

In the Legal Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion (Wall AO) dating back to 2004, the ICJ was confronted with a question concerning the legality of the construction of a wall by Israel within the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court not only dismissed Israel’s security justifications for the construction of the wall, but also concluded that Israel was breaching the right to self-determination of Palestinian people and its obligations as Occupying Power under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). 

Fast forward twenty years and a new request for an advisory opinion reached the Court, this time on the Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The connection with the Wall AO is clear. The Court was faced with two related questions concerning the legal consequences stemming from the continuous violations by Israel of the law of occupation. Building upon the Wall AO, the ICJ had little difficulty in finding Israeli practices in breach of IHL and IHRL. The Court indeed held that the law of occupation still applies (at least partially) to Palestine and reaffirmed Israel’s human rights obligations in the occupied territories due to the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties when a state exercises jurisdiction outside its territory. The ICJ also concluded that 'the sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power […] renders Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful' (para 261)—a finding that carried significant legal consequences for Israel, the United Nations, and third States.

The present request for the advisory opinion needs to be read within this broader picture of advisory proceedings before the ICJ.

The ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction: Scope, Requirements, and Discretion

The ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction is based on Article 65(1) of its Statute, which allows the Court to render an opinion on legal matters referred to it by authorised organs. Article 96 UN Charter complements Article 65 ICJ Statute by identifying which organs have the right to request an advisory opinion to the ICJ. Under this provision, the UN General Assembly—the UN organ which referred the present question to the Court—is authorised to request an advisory opinion with respect to ‘any legal question’. The legal nature of the question asked appears to be the only formal requirement that the General Assembly must fulfil in requesting an advisory opinion. Given the question posed to the ICJ, explicitly referring to the obligation of Israel as an Occupying Power and as a UN member state, the fulfilment of this requisite in this case does not seem to present major obstacles.

Advisory opinions are non-binding, thus the requesting organ remains free to decide the extent to which the opinion is actually given effect. Nonetheless, the role of advisory opinions should not be underestimated. Despite their non-binding character, they are highly authoritative in the clarification and application of international law. In the history of the Court, this has sometimes had the effect of prompting UN organs (notably, the General Assembly) to request advisory opinions on matters closely related to bilateral disputes between states, especially in circumstances in which the states affected would be otherwise unwilling to accept the contentious jurisdiction of the ICJ. This has certainly characterised the previous advisory opinions on the legal obligations of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, namely the Legal Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion, and the more recent Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion. In these cases, the Court has stressed that the Palestinian question is one ‘of particularly acute concern to the United Nations and one which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute’ (Wall AO, para 50), as ‘although it involves Israel and Palestine, [it] concerns the responsibilities of the United Nations and wider questions of international peace and security’ (Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory AO, para 33). Considering the role and the responsibility of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security, the fact that the above mentioned advisory opinions relate to an existing dispute between Israel and Palestine did not preclude the Court from exercising its advisory jurisdiction. Should concerns regarding the ICJ jurisdiction arise in the course of this new proceeding, it seems likely that the Court will adopt the same line of reasoning and affirm once again its jurisdiction in the Palestinian question. 

However, the fact that the ICJ has jurisdiction does not entail that it is obliged to exercise it. The Court has repeatedly emphasised that the formulation of Article 65(1) ICJ Statute in a conditional manner (i.e. [t]he Court may give an advisory opinion) grants the Court ‘discretionary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions for jurisdiction are met’ (see for example Wall AO, para 44 and Kosovo AO, para 29). At the same time, the Court recognises its function as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its activity in answering requests for advisory opinions as constituting part of its participation in the activities of the organisation. Therefore, a refusal to exercise jurisdiction must be grounded in ‘compelling reasons’, meaning that the ICJ would only decline to render an opinion when the exercise of jurisdiction is incompatible with its judicial function and integrity. In light of the previous advisory opinions on Palestine, this does not appear to be the case in the present proceeding.

Key Legal Issues to Watch

Some of the key issues to watch in the upcoming hearings will be how States engage with questions concerning the privileges and immunities of UNRWA, as well as the facilitation—or obstruction—of humanitarian assistance.

a. UNRWA’s Privileges and Immunities

One of the central legal issues before the Court, as Huremagić observed early on,  concerns whether Israel’s recent actions targeting UNRWA are compatible with its obligations under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which Israel has been a party since 1949. These actions include the 28 October 2024 Knesset legislation, which banned its operations, and evicted the agency from its premises in East Jerusalem.

Article 105(1) UN Charter provides that: “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.” Building on this provision, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations establishes a comprehensive regime to protect the functioning of the United Nations and its agencies. According to Article II, Section 2, the “property and assets of the United Nations shall be immune from every form of legal process.” Section 3 of the same article provides that “[t]he premises of the United Nations shall be inviolable,” and that the UN’s property and assets “shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation, and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative action.” As Bjorge reminds us, the inviolability of the UN's premises ‘is absolute’. In addition, Article V, Section 18(a) stipulates that officials of the United Nations are immune from legal process “in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.”

The General Assembly, in the preamble to Resolution 79/232, suggests that “a situation may exist in which a difference has arisen between the United Nations and Israel regarding … the interpretation or application of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.” In such a case, Article VIII, Section 30 of the Convention provides that “a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved” and that “[t]he opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties.” Quite interestingly, this raises the possibility that the advisory opinion rendered in the present proceedings may carry more than interpretive weight—potentially binding Israel and the United Nations with respect to the dispute concerning privileges and immunities.

b. Facilitation and Obstruction of Humanitarian Assistance

Some states may argue that Israel’s actions amount to the starvation of civilians, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law when used as a method of warfare (see Additional Protocol I, Article 54(1); ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 53). When committed intentionally, starvation of civilians constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8(2)(b)(xxv)).

Under Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, each High Contracting Party must “allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores” and other essential goods intended for civilians—specifically for “children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.” However, this obligation is conditional: passage may be denied if there are “serious reasons for fearing” diversion of goods, ineffective control, or if their delivery would offer a “definite advantage” to the enemy’s military efforts or economy. States may also require that distribution take place under the supervision of Protecting Powers—typically a neutral party, such as an impartial State or international organization, like UNRWA, acting on behalf of the civilian population.

Relatively similar conditions appear in Article 54 of Additional Protocol I , which prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. While it permits attacks on objects indispensable to survival when used for direct military support, it imposes a strict limitation:

“In no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.”

Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I, but the rule contained in Article 54 may reflect customary law, to which it is bound.

In contrast, Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies in situations of occupation, imposes a stricter standard. It provides that when the population of an occupied territory is “inadequately supplied,” the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes and “facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.” The use of “shall agree” reflects a binding obligation, not a discretionary one. Such schemes, undertaken by States or impartial humanitarian organizations, must include the provision of foodstuffs, medical supplies, and clothing. Unlike Article 23, Article 59 does not allow exceptions based on military necessity. This means that States have no discretion to withhold consent to humanitarian relief operations in occupied territories when the population is in need. 

As Cooper has acknowledged, “[r]egardless of the classification of the conflict, it is difficult to see how Israel can completely block humanitarian assistance without violating” international humanitarian law. Whether such conduct would amount to a war crime or a violation of IHL is another question. In that respect—and particularly with regard to the stringency of Israel’s obligations—it is important to recall that the ICJ affirmed in its 2024 advisory opinion on Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem that the law of occupation has continued to apply to Gaza, at least in part, in the period between the Israeli “disengagement” of 2005 and the escalation that began in 2023.

i. Relevant Legal Findings on the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance in Gaza

In a separate case brought by South Africa against Israel under the Genocide Convention, the ICJ has issued three sets of provisional measures ordering Israel to enable humanitarian relief. In January 2024, the Court ordered Israel to

“take immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance to address the adverse conditions of life faced by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”

In March 2024, the Court unanimously found that worsening conditions in Gaza, “in particular the spread of famine and starvation,” required Israel to:

“Take all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay, in full cooperation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance, including food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation requirements, as well as medical supplies and medical care to Palestinians throughout Gaza, including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points and maintaining them open for as long as necessary.”

Since then, there have been several developments in the situation, including threats to close the Rafah crossing, which led to a new provisional order from the Court, as well as the ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Hamas on 17 January 2025, which collapsed in March. Yet, the UNRWA Commissioner-General, Philippe Lazzarini, posted on X (formerly Twitter) on 23 March 2025, less than a month before the ICJ is scheduled to hear oral submissions by States on the question posed by the General Assembly:

“It’s been three weeks since the Israeli authorities banned the entry of supplies to Gaza. No food, no medicines, no water, no fuel.”

In parallel, it might be taken into account, that in its November 2024 decision to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, the International Criminal Court (ICC) found reasonable grounds to believe that both individuals “intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population in Gaza of objects indispensable to their survival,” including food, water, medicine, fuel, and electricity, from 8 October 2023 to 20 May 2024. The Chamber found no clear military necessity or legal justification under international humanitarian law for the restrictions placed on humanitarian relief.

It will be interesting to see whether and how States raise these sources, how they interpret relevant provisions of international humanitarian law and past judicial findings, as well as statements from the UNRWA Commissioner-General, and whether they identify potential loopholes or reasons to depart from previous interpretations.

ii. Human Rights Obligations and the Broader Legal and Territorial Context

Another key point to watch will be whether States invoke international human rights law alongside IHL, particularly provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—such as Article 12, which guarantees the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, including access to clean water and sanitation, and Article 11, which protects the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food.

Equally important will be the extent to which States focus narrowly on the current military operation in Gaza, or whether they adopt a broader perspective, addressing the long-standing blockade of Gaza since 2005, as well as the legal obligations of Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem under both humanitarian and human rights law. 

Who Is Participating?

Among the 45 states and international organisations that have submitted written statements, 40 will express their views in the course of the public hearings (see the schedule for the hearings here). Bangladesh, Iceland, Ireland, Israel and the Philippines are the states which chose not to partake in the oral phase. In their place, five new states will join the public hearing, namely Panama, Qatar, Mauritius, Sudan and Switzerland. Among these, of particular interest is the position of Panama as not only has the state not submitted a written statement, but also it abstained in the General Assembly during the vote for the adoption of Resolution 79/232. 

Four of the P5 (China, France, the Russian Federation and the United States) are participating in the oral proceedings, alongside relevant players in the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran). Norway, as the main sponsor of the Resolution leading to the advisory proceeding, is expected to play a prominent role in the oral phase. Eight EU member states (Belgium, Spain, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia) will also join the proceedings. The pleadings of the United States and Hungary will be particularly relevant, as these are the only two states taking part in the public hearings which voted against the submission of the request for the advisory opinion to the Court in the General Assembly in December last year.

It is not surprising that many of the states interested in participating in the public hearings are also involved in the case that South Africa brought against Israel regarding the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip. As noted earlier, the provision of ‘urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance’ constitutes a central part in the preliminary measures ordered by the Court in the course of those proceedings.

With three time-slots allocated, Palestine will be given ample room during the first day of hearings to express its position. Unsurprisingly given its absence in the oral phase of the previous advisory opinions on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (see here and here), Israel is instead not scheduled to present its views in The Hague. 

Three international organisations—the League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union—will close the oral phase on the last day of hearings.