Archive MLSE seminar

Author: Michal Bodicky joint with Ferdinand Pieroth (Yale Uni), Christian Seel (UM)
Date and time: January 30th, 2024 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.23
Title: Elimination Contests with Fatigue
Abstract: We study the effect of fatigue on elimination contests in a model with two competing semi-finalists and one directly qualified finalist. Fatigue enters the model as the promoted semi-finalist’s valuation for winning the final, decreasing her effort in the semi-final. Under the total effort maximizing seeding, the fatigue introduction might increase total effort and effort in each round. This result relies on the exclusion principle and a novel increased incentive for weak competitors in the semi-final. We discuss design implications for the timing of sports tournaments and promotion contests.

Author: Kaiqi Liu (UM, MPE) joint with Christian Seel (UM, MPE), Stefan Terstiege (UM, MPE) and Hannes Rusch (UM, MPE)
Date and time: February 6th, 2024 (14:00-15:00), TS53 C-1.05
Title: Equilibrium in Higher Education: Analysing Student Choices and Market Responses in the Presence of For-Profit Universities
Abstract: Our paper investigates the impact of the private for-profit universities on the global higher education market, including their interaction with existing institutions. We introduce a theoretical model that encompasses students, public universities, and both private non-profit and for-profit universities. This model is adaptable to different national contexts and allows for scenarios with either two or three types of universities. Our analysis focuses on students' application decisions, the resulting university rankings in the equilibria, and the optimal tuition fee-setting strategies at for-profit universities. We discover that, irrespective of the market composition, for-profit universities consistently attract lower-tier students in all equilibria. Conversely, the ranking of private non-profit and public universities varies across different equilibria. Under one plausible assumption, only the equilibria with the private non-profit university at the top are group strategy proof. Additionally, we analyse the optimal tuition fee structures for private for-profit universities in two specific equilibria. Given the various possible equilibria, it is ultimately the responsibility of policymakers to determine desired outcomes and set appropriate conditions. Our findings provide insights into policy formulation and facilitate cross-country comparisons in the higher education sector.

Author: Andrés Perea (UM, KE)
Date and time: March 19th, 2024 (13:00-14:00), TS53 H0.06
Title: Consequentialism in Decision Problems and Games.
Abstract: In many control problems there is only limited information about the actions that will be available at future stages. We introduce a framework where the Controller chooses actions sequentially, one at a time. Her goal is to maximize the probability that the infinite sequence of actions is an element of a given subset G. The set G, called the goal, is assumed to be a tail set. The Controller's choices are restricted: specifically, at any particular stage, she must choose an action from a given action set (these are the available actions); the action set may depend on the Controller’s previous choices. Action sets are chosen randomly by nature from a given distribution. We consider several information structures defined by how far ahead into the future the Controller knows what actions will be available.
In the special case where all action sets are singletons (and thus the Controller is a dummy), Kolmogorov’s 0-1 law says that the probability for the goal to be reached is 0 or 1. We construct a number of counterexamples to show that in general the value of the control problem can be strictly between 0 and 1, and derive several sufficient conditions for the 0-1 ``law" to hold.

Author: Arkadi Predtetchinski (UM, MPE) (joint with János Flesch, William D Sudderth, and Xavier Venel)
Date and time: March 19th, 2024 (13:00-14:00), TS53 H0.06
Title: Zero-one Laws for a Control Problem with Random Action Sets
Abstract: In many control problems there is only limited information about the actions that will be available at future stages. We introduce a framework where the Controller chooses actions sequentially, one at a time. Her goal is to maximize the probability that the infinite sequence of actions is an element of a given subset G. The set G, called the goal, is assumed to be a tail set. The Controller's choices are restricted: specifically, at any particular stage, she must choose an action from a given action set (these are the available actions); the action set may depend on the Controller’s previous choices. Action sets are chosen randomly by nature from a given distribution. We consider several information structures defined by how far ahead into the future the Controller knows what actions will be available.

Author: Markus Möller (joint with Aram Grigoryan (UC San Diego))
Date and time: April 9th, 2024 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.24
Title: A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms 
Abstract: In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may not be able to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is for participants to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms, such as the Deferred Acceptance, the Immediate Acceptance, and the Serial Dictatorship. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable subclasses of allocation mechanisms.

Author: Andries Vermeulen (UM, KE) (joint with János Flesch, Chris Kops, and Anna Zseleva)
Date and time: April 23rd, 2024 (12:30-13:30), TS53 A1.23
Title: A general definition of perfect equilibrium 
Abstract: We propose a definition of perfect equilibrium that can be applied to a wide class of games in strategic form. The two key features in the definition are a) using nets instead of sequences, b) using a new concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed interpretation of the notion of a carrier of a strategy. In the case of finite action sets our definition coincides with the original definition of Selten (1975), and in the compact-continuous case our definition yields a nonempty and compact set of perfect equilibria, which are all weak perfect equilibria according to the definition of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995). We present several examples which both motivate and illustrate our definition, including games with discontinuous payoffs as well as games played with finitely additive strategies where our definition has a bite.

Author: Bas Dietzenbacher (UM, KE) (joint work with Emre Dogan)
Date and time: May 28th, 2024 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.23
Title: Population monotonicity and egalitarianism
Abstract: This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which population monotonicity (no player is worse off when additional players enter the game) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which is the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme. On this domain, which strictly includes the class of convex games, population monotonicity and egalitarian core selection together characterize the Dutta-Ray solution. We relate the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme to several other classes of games.

Author: Andrew Mackenzie (joint work with Christian Trudeau)
Date and time: June 6th, 2024 (15:00-16:00), TS53 A0.24
Title: Auctions for a regulated monopolist
Abstract: A monopolist with a convex production technology must elicit consumer demand in order to determine price and quantity, and a regulator requires that efficient and fair allocations be implemented in dominant strategies. We characterize the class of mechanisms available to the regulated monopolist. Among those that moreover guarantee ex-post voluntary participation across both sides of the market, we find that (i) in line with previous results from the literature, the VCG mechanisms are optimal for the producer, and (ii) a novel class of mechanisms are optimal for consumers. This latter class involves sometimes distributing part of the production profit to consumers regardless of whether they purchase anything.

Author: Anh Trieu (UM, KE) (joint work with Iwan Bos, Marc Schroder, Dries Vermeulen)
Date and time: Jun 11th, 2024 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.24
Title: Matching Maximization Mechanism with Multiple Items
Abstract: There are many situations in which policymakers are primarily concerned with the availability and accessibility of goods or services. Examples include electricity, food, housing, medical supplies, et cetera. In such cases, the social goal may be to maximize the number of transactions, which we refer to as a maximal matching, instead of maximizing total utility. This paper attempts to answer the question whether such maximal matching outcome can be obtained in a multi-demand and multi-supply setting.

Author: Christopher Kops (UM,KE)
Date and time: December 12th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.24
Title: Who Influences Whom? Identifying the Social Network from Behavior
Abstract: ​Individual behavior is often influenced by that of peers. The identification of such peer influence from observable behavior constitutes a classic problem in the social sciences. When can we identify the social network of influence? We propose a simple model of social influence and interactions. In this framework, we characterize exactly which behavior and graph structures are informative when it comes to the question of identifying the underlying network of influence.

Author: Wout de Vos (Tilburg University)
Date and time: November 28th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.23
Title: Influencing opinion networks – optimization and games
Abstract: We consider a model of influence over a network with finite-horizon opinion dynamics. The network consists of agents that update their opinions via a trust structure as in the DeGroot dynamics. The model considers two potential external influencers that have fixed and opposite opinions. They aim to maximally impact the aggregate state of opinions at the end of the finite horizon by targeting with precision one agent in one specific time period. In the case of only one influencer, we characterize optimal targets on the basis of two features: shift and amplification. Also, conditions are provided under which a specific target is optimal: the maximum-amplification target. In the case of two influencers, we focus on the existence and characterization of pure strategy equilibria in the corresponding two-person strategic zero-sum game. Roughly speaking, if the initial opinions are not too much in favour of either influencer, the influencers’ equilibrium behaviour is also driven by the amplification of targets.

Author: Günnur Ege Bilgin (Bonn University)
Date and time: October 31st, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.23
Title: Decentralized Many-to-One Matching with Random Search
Abstract: : I study a decentralized many-to-one search model with frictions, where a finite number of firms and workers meet randomly and time is nearly costless. Different than the existing literature, I show that stable matchings of the many-to-one market may not be enforceable under Markovian search equilibria even if agents are sufficiently patient. Nevertheless, they are enforceable in markets with aligned preferences, and I construct the equilibrium strategy profile that enforces the unique stable matching. Moreover, in many-to-one search, firms collect workers in a cumulative manner, where they expand their employment set over time. This distinct characteristic affects the search process fundamentally by allowing firms to strategically use the number of their vacancies over time, leading to more favorable outcomes for themselves. Therefore, unlike centralized markets, there is no straightforward related-market connection between one-to-one and many-to-one search models in the decentralized case. I establish one sufficient condition on the preferences of agents to retrieve the connection, which also prevents the enforcement of unstable matchings in equilibrium.

Author: Joep van Sloun (UM,KE)
Date and time: October 10th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.24
Title: Rationalizable Behavior in the Hotelling Model with Waiting Costs
Abstract: : This paper revisits the Hotelling model with waiting costs. For the two firm case and asymmetric efficiency levels and the three firm case with symmetric efficiency levels, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure choices. That is why we use a different solution concept, called point rationalizability. We characterize the set of point rationalizable choices for the two firm case, and hopefully more results will follow for three and more firms in the future.

Author: Shaul Rosner (Reichman University). 
Date and time: September 29th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 C-1.05
Title: Congestion Games with Rank-Based Utilities
Abstract: : Studies in behavioural science show that individuals are often concerned primarily about their relative welfare, rather than their absolute well-being. In this talk we will define and study a variant of congestion games that reflects this phenomenon. In a congestion game with rank-based utilities, the players are partitioned into competition sets, and the goal of every player is to minimize its cost relative to its competitors. Specifically, the primary goal of a player is to minimize the rank of its cost among its competitors, while minimizing the cost itself is a secondary objective. This fits environments with strong competition among the participants, in which the relative performance of the players determine their welfare. We show that games with rank-based utilities are significantly different from classical congestion games, and that competition may lead to a poor outcome with respect to the existence of Nash Equilibrium and its quality. We consider two classes of congestion games: Job-scheduling games, in which each player selects a machine, aiming to have a low completion time relative to its competitors, and cost-sharing games, in which players fairly share the activation cost of resources they use, each aiming to have a relatively low payment.

Author: Niloufar Yousefimanesh (UM,KE)
Date and time: Jan 17th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.23 
Title: On the Non-existence of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Price-Quantity Games: A Sunk Cost Paradox
Abstract: ​In this paper we study a variant of the classical Hotelling model, where firms are located at the extreme points of an interval of [0, 1] and their strategic variables are both price and quantity, while using a new approach to the so-called ”sunk cost”. The problem of non existence of a pure equilibrium in a price-quantity Hotelling setting when firms produce similar products has been discussed widely in the literature. In this paper we showed that under certain conditions, the equilibrium can be restored.

Author: Stefan Terstiege (UM,KE)
Date and time: Jan 31st, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.23
Title: Product Variety and Market Segmentation
Abstract: ​We study market segmentation in settings where a monopolistic seller possesses an inventory containing several variants of a given good and needs to decide which variant to offer. We fully characterize the producer-consumer surplus pairs induced by market segmentation as product variety becomes large, and prove that whether or not the seller can price discriminate is irrelevant. We show that, along the Pareto frontier, higher consumer surplus entails lower social welfare, but is compatible with greater privacy. We then study market segmentation arising from the sale of consumer data by intermediaries. Competition among data intermediaries results in lower match quality between consumers and products and lower social welfare.

Author: Pedro González Fernández (UM,ALGEC)
Date and time: Feb 14th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.23
Title: Belief Bias Identification
Abstract: ​In recent years, the field of belief updating has seen substantial efforts towards structuring and categorizing probabilistic belief biases. Despite these efforts, there remains a lack of a comprehensive model that can accurately identify a broad range of these biases within a standard experimental setting. I propose a theoretical framework that addresses this issue. By recognizing that individuals have inherent uncertainty in their beliefs, I have developed a testable model that not only offers improved identification of belief biases but also encompasses a wider range of them. The implications of such a unifying framework are significant, particularly in the realm of applied economics where it provides a systematic method for choosing between conflicting behavioral explanations in situations involving multiple belief biases.

Author: Marc Schröder (UM,KE)
Date and time: Feb 28th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.22
Title: Hotelling with network externalities
Abstract: ​We study a variant of Hotelling's famous location game. In this game firms have to decide on a location, whereas consumers care about their travel distance as well as the number of other consumers visiting each firm. In the first part of the talk, we assume that consumers induce negative network externalities (or congestion costs). We prove that a consumer equilibrium exists, is unique and changes continuously with the firms' locations. For the location game between firms, this implies the existence of an equilibrium for a small number of even firms and non-existence for an odd number of firms. In the second part of the talk, we consider positive network externalities (popularity). This assumption implies that multiple consumer equilibria might exist, which yields very different conclusions for the location game.​

Author: Christian Seel (UM,MPE), joint with Markus Reisinger and Frauke Stehr
Date and time: Mar 7st, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.22 
Title: Hotelling Revisited -The Price-then-Location Model 
Abstract: ​In several markets, such as the magazine or restaurant market, firms choose prices for a longer time horizon than product content, which can be varied more flexibly. In this paper, we analyze the pricing and content choices of competitive firms in such a setting. We consider a two-stage game in which two firms first choose prices and then locations on the Hotelling line, allowing for differences in firms' costs. We derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome for moderate differences in cost. At equilibrium, firms choose pure strategies at the price stage and mix in terms of location, with the more efficient firm locating closer to the middle. For sufficiently symmetric production costs, any subgame-perfect equilibrium involves mixing at both stages.

Author: Andrés Perea (UM,KE)
Date and time: Mar 21st, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.22 
Title: Linear Psychological Games
Abstract: ​ In a psychological game, the preferences over your own choices may depend on higher-order beliefs, that is, beliefs about the opponents' beliefs. We focus on a special class of psychological games, which we call linear psychological games, where your preferences only depend on finitely many orders of beliefs, your preferences only depend on a summary statistic of your higher-order beliefs, called higher-order expectations, and where your utility depends linearly on your higher-order expectation. Such games can be represented by a finite utility matrix, just like standard games. We then focus on the central reasoning concept of common belief in rationality, and look for a recursive procedure that yields precisely those choices that are possible under common belief in rationality. We find that elimination of choices alone is not sufficient, which leads us to a more sophisticated procedure that recursively eliminates choices and higher-order expectations from the game.

Author: Léonard Brice (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
Date and time: Mar 28th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 H0.06 
Title: Programming machines to play against rational agents
Abstract: During the last decades, game theory has raised more and more attention in theoretical computer science. Indeed, algorithms that decide whether some strategy is winning in a two-player zero-sum game can easily be applied to decide whether some programme behaves properly in the face of unpredictable events. Things get more complicated when those events are partially predictable, because they are caused by agents that pursue a certain objective, and that should be considered as rational. Then, there is a need for algorithms handling concepts such as Nash equilibria, or subgame-perfect equilibria. In this presentation, we will define precisely the problems we are studying in that framework, explain the main motivations behind them, and give the main ideas in the algorithms we use.

Author: Freija van Lent (UM,DAD)
Date and time: April 11th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.24 
Title: Envy-free Pricing of Seats in a Planetarium
Abstract: We study a geometric envy-free pricing problem with a single item demand. The aim of the seller is to maximize the revenue by assigning prices to points and by allocating customers to these points in an envy-free manner, i.e., every allocated customer receives a point of the highest possible utility, and all non-allocated customers cannot afford any point. We also consider a discrete version where customers purchase the tiles of a regular tessellation of the plane. For the special case of continuous version of the problem, where all customers have the same preferred point, we introduce a dynamic programming algorithm solving the problem in polynomial time. For the discrete version of the problem, we extend the dynamic programming algorithm to the quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme.

Author: Bas Dietzenbacher (UM,KE)
Date and time: April 25th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.22 
Title: Stable streaming platforms: a cooperative game approach
Abstract: Streaming platforms such as Spotify are popular media services where content creators may offer their content. Because these platforms operate in a highly competitive market, content creators may leave the platform and join elsewhere. This paper studies conditions under which content creators have no incentives to leave the platform and thus stability can be preserved. Methodology/results: We introduce a stylized model for streaming platform situations and associate these situations with a cooperative game. We focus on the (non)emptiness of the core to analyze the stability of the streaming platforms. It turns out that both stable and unstable streaming platforms exist. We show that for streaming platforms operating in a market where users have completely opposite streaming behavior, stability cannot always be
preserved. However, in markets where users are more similar in their streaming behavior, stability can be preserved. We further analyze the stability of streaming platforms by means of numerical experiments. Our results indicate that stability of streaming platforms generally is a delicate matter. Managerial implications: Streaming platforms are more likely to be stable in markets where users are similar in their streaming behavior. To avoid that content creators leave the platform, it is therefore recommended to focus on particular market segments where these similarities occur.

Author: Andrew Mackenzie (UM,ALGEC)
Date and time: May 2nd, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A0.23 
Title: Tract Housing, the Core, and Pendulum Auctions
Abstract: We consider a model of tract housing where buyers and sellers have (i) wealth constraints, and (ii) unit demand over identical indivisible objects represented by a valuation. First, we characterize the strong core. Second, we characterize the bilateral weak core, or the weak core allocations with no side-payments. Finally, when buyer wealth constraints and valuations are private information and when transfers are discrete, we introduce two families of pendulum auctions, both of which consist of obviously strategy-proof implementations of the bilateral weak core. The buyer-optimal pendulum auctions are preferred by the buyers but are inefficient when side-payments are possible, while the efficient pendulum auctions are efficient.

Author: Dries Vermeulen (UM,KE)
Date and time: May 16th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 H0.06
Title: A New Characterization of Regular Equilibrium
Abstract: We show that an equilibrium point of a normal form game is regular in the sense of Harsanyi (1973) if and only if near to the equilibrium point the equilibrium correspondence is a smooth function.

Author: Anh Trieu (UM,KE)
Date and time: May 30th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.23
Title: Matching maximizing mechanism in a two-sided auction setting
Abstract: We consider an implementable direct mechanism that maximizes the number of matchings in a two-sided auction setting. In this setting, m consumers have unit demand over identical indivisible items which are produced by n producers. Each consumer has their own valuation for the item and each producer has their own cost to produce the item. All valuations and costs are private information. We develop a direct mechanism that includes a matching rule and a payment rule. The matching rule matches consumers to producers such that the number of matchings is maximized and for each matched pair, the consumer's valuation is higher or equal to the producer's cost. Then, we analyze the mechanism and compare its total number of matching as well as its deficit to those of the VCG mechanism.

Author: Ferdinand Pieroth (Yale University)
Date and time: June 20th, 2023 (13:00-14:00), TS53 A1.23
Title: Unique Implementation with Optimal Monitoring
Abstract: In a multi-agent moral hazard setting, we study the optimal design of the monitoring and compensation scheme to uniquely implement universal high effort when the principal has a limited number of contractible messages available. If restrictions on this number are maximally strong, the optimal incentive contract features intra-firm completion: sub-teams compete for a bonus payment, and each worker's impact on their team's success is chosen optimally. As the number of available contractible messages increases, using more intricate ways to misalign workers' wage schemes allows the principal to extract the full surplus from a number of workers that is growing exponentially in the number of available messages.

Author: Alexander Vostroknutov (UM, MPE)
Date and time: October 25th 2022, 13:00; A0.23
Title: Endogenous institutions and economic policy
Abstract: Although the importance of institutions for economic growth is well-understood, no model with endogenously emerging institutions exists that would lend itself to policy analysis. We propose a new modelling framework, designed to fill this gap, where agents not only maximize their personal consumption, but also care about morality: they receive additional utility from cooperating with others by following social norms. Under these assumptions, we model the emergence of formal/informal and inclusive/extractive institutions for facilitating cooperation. Institutional change happens when moral agents choose between existing institutions on the basis of their profitability and ``fairness'' that is determined endogenously from the context of the game. We show with examples how the framework can accommodate well-known structural distortions that go along with poor quality of public institutions, such as informality and clientelism. We also demonstrate the usefulness of this approach for designing economic policy that can directly take institutions and their functioning into account. The framework allows for case-specific calibration that can help evaluate policy effectiveness, such as for example tax policy in the presence of a large informal sector. 

Author: Christopher Kops (UM,KE)
Date and time: November 22nd 2022, 13:00; A0.23
Title: Revealing What Really Matters: A Theory of Feature Identification from Choice
Abstract: Choice is driven by the features that describe alternatives. But not all conceivable features may matter for decision-makers and different features may matter for different decision makers. An analyst cannot observe directly the description of an alternative used by a decision maker. To what extent do choices reveal which features matter? We develop a theory of relevant feature identification. In particular, we characterise which pairs of a choice observation and a feasible set are informative, partially or fully, about the features that matter for choice, on the assumption of preference maximisation.

Author: János Flesch (UM, KE)
Date and time: 29th of November 2022, 13:00; A0.23
Title: Existence of equilibria in repeated games with general payoffs
Abstract: I will give an overview of some recent results in a research line, which I have been working on with Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Arkadi Predtetchinski and Eilon Solan. We consider repeated games on the infinite horizon, with a finite number of players and finite action sets. In these games, the players choose actions simultaneously in each period. The payoff function of each player is general: it is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite sequence of action profiles chosen during the game. Such payoff functions have been studied since Blackwell (1969) in repeated games, and they encompass the traditional payoffs used in economics (e.g., the discounted payoff and the long-run average payoff) and in the computer science literature (e.g., Büchi, Müller). Each player's goal is to maximize her own expected payoff. We also consider a generalization of this model to stochastic games, where the underlying state changes depending on the actions chosen by the players. I discuss recent results in these games for the existence of (approximate) Nash equilibrium and for some related problems.

Author: Dmitriy Kvasov (Waseda University)
Date and time: 6th of December 2022, 13:00; A0.23
Title: Reexamination of strategy concept in extensive form games
Abstract: We show that two strategies are Kuhn equivalent if and only if they induce the same probability measure over terminal nodes against some profile of completely mixed behaviour strategies of the other players. This result allows us to embed the equivalence classes of strategies in the probability measures over terminal nodes for various strategy concepts. This, in turn, allows a very clean statement of the relation between the various sets of strategies in games with perfect recall, linear games, and nonlinear games. It also proves useful in defining and analyzing solution concepts in games without perfect recall, and, in particular, in nonlinear games.

Joep van Sloun (KE, UM)
January 10 (TUE), 13:00, online
Title: Rationalizable Behavior in the Hotelling-Downs Model of Spatial Competition

Bas Dietzenbacher (KE, UM)
March 15 (TUE), 13:00, H0.06
Title: Two-bound core games and the nucleolus

Florian Heine (Tilburg University)
March 22 (TUE), 13:00, H0.06
Title: Pro-Social Risk-Taking and Intergroup Conflict – A Volunteer’s Dilemma Experiment

Elias Tsakas (MPE, UM)
April 13 (WED), 13:00, A0.23
Title: Belief identification with state-dependent utilities

Lars Wittrock (MPE, UM)
May 4 (WED), 11:00, H0.06
Title: Useful Forecasting: Belief Elicitation for Decision Making

Arkadi Predtetchinski (MPE, UM)
May 9 (MON), 13:30, H0.06
Title: Bounded foresight in random decision problems

Mehmet Ismael (King’s College London)
May 23 (MON), 12:00, H0.06
Title: Conditional strategy equilibrium

Salil Sharma (SSE)
May 31 (TUE), 13:00, online
Title: Costly Sequential Screening

Orin Munk (Tel Aviv University)
June 15 (WED), 12:00, H0.06
Title: Sunspot Equilibrium in Stochastic Games

Giang Tran (MPE, UM)
June 21 (TUE), 14:00, H0.04
Title: Other-regarding reference-dependent preferences

Andrés Perea (KE,UM)
November 16 (TUE), 13:00, A1.23
Title: Towards a Bridge between Decision Theory and Game Theory

Roberto Cerina (DAD, UM)
February 2 (TUE), 13:00, Web-Seminar
Converting the Twitter API into an Online Panel via Human Intelligence to Measure Public Opinion
Abstract

Andrés Perea (KE,UM)
February 23 (TUE), 13:00, Web-Seminar
Foundation for expected utility in decision problems and games
Abstract

Marc Schröder (KE,UM)
March 23 (TUE), 13:00, Web-Seminar
A Greedy Algorithm for the Social Golfer and the Oberwolfach Problem
Abstract​

Arkadi Predtetchinski (MPE,UM)
May 18 (TUE), 11:00, Web-Seminar
Random perfect information games
Abstract

Anastas Tenev (MPE, UM)
September 29 (TUE), 13:00, Web-seminar
Persuading Communicating Voters
Abstract

Bas Dietzenbacher (KE, UM)
October 6 (TUE), 13:00, Web-seminar
Fair and consistent prize allocation in competitions
Abstract

Peter Bayer (Toulouse School of Economics)
November 10 (TUE), 13:00, Web-seminar
Optimism leads to optimality: Ambiguity in network formation.
Abstract

Benoit Duvocelle (KE, UM)
February 18 (TUE), 12:00, A 1.23
A competitive search game with a moving target
Abstract

Christopher Stapenhurst (ESRC, School of Economics, Edinburgh)
March 2 (MON), 12:00, A 0.24
Moral hazard with Multiple Monitors and Random Incentives
Abstract

Andrew Mackenzie (MPE, UM)
June 10 (WED), 14:00, ZOOM
Menu Mechanisms
Abstract

Stefan Terstiege, (MPE, UM)
June 18 (THU), 11:00, ZOOM
Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer
Abstract

Frauke Stehr (MPE, UM)
September 16 (MON), 12:00, A0.23
Making Up for the Harm One Causes – An Experiment on Voluntary Compensation Behavior
Abstract

Hendrik Rommeswinkel (Department of Economics, National Taiwan University)
October 1 (TUE), 12:00, A0.23
Measuring Consumer Freedom
Abstract

Peter Werner (MPE, UM)
October 8 (TUE), 12:00, A0.24
Social Norms and Market Behavior – Evidence from a large population sample
Abstract

Niels Mourmans (KE, UM)
October 15 (TUE), 13:00, C-1.03
When is iterated elimination of choices enough in psychological games?
Abstract

Alexander Vostroknutov (MPE, UM)
October 28 (MON), 12:00, H0.06
Injunctive Norms and Moral Rules
Abstract

Mehmet Ismail (Department of Political Economy, KCL, UK)
December 9 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
The Story of Conflict and Cooperation
Abstract

Andrés Perea (KE, UM)
January 14 (MON), 12:00, A1.22
Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
Abstract

Marc Schröder (RWTH, Aachen University)
January 21 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Price-of-Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs
Abstract

Andew Mackenzie (AE1, UM)
April 25 (THU). 12:00, A0.24
Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms
Abstract

Aida Abiad Monge (KE, UM)
April 30 (TUE), 13:30-14:15, A1.23
Are almost all graphs determined by their spectrum?
Abstract

Giang Trần (AE1, UM)
May 6 (MON), 12:00, G1.01
Measuring Competitiveness and Cooperativeness
Abstract

Srinivas K Arigapudi (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
May 7 (TUE), 12:00, A0.24
Exit from Equilibrium in Coordination Games under Probit choice
Abstract

Ben D’Exelle (University of East Anglia)
May 27 (MON), 12:00, A0.24
Uptake of Family Planning Services: An Experiment on the Husband’s Involvement
Abstract

Li Peixuan (University of Hong Kong)
June 7 (FRI), 12:00, G1.01
An Arbitrary Starting Linear Trace Procedure for Computing Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games
Abstract

Anastas Tenev (MPE, UM)
June 11 (TUE), 12:00, A0.24
Stronger bonds with less connected agents in stable resource sharing networks
Abstract

Benoit Duvocelle (KE, UM)
September 3 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
No-regret learning in time-varying concave games
Abstract

Peter Werner (AE1, UM)
September 10 (MON), 12:00, C-1.05
Wage negotiations and strategic responses to transparency
Abstract

Víctor H. González-Jiménez (University of Vienna)
September 17 (MON), 12:00, H0.04
Probability Distortions as Incentives
Abstract

Péter Bayer (AE1, UM)
October 16 (TUE), 12:00, A0.24
Best-response dynamics in directed network games
Abstract

Henrik Zaunbrecher (AE1, UM)
October 22 (MON), 12:00, A0.24
Income Trends and Redistribution Decisions
Abstract

Ferdinand Pieroth (UM)
October 29 (MON), 12:00, A0.24
Abstract

Jörg Gross (Leiden University)
November 7 (WED), 15:00, C-1.07
Preference for Individualism Creates a Modern Tragedy of the Commons
Abstract

Emre Ergin (AE1, UM)
November 13 (TUE), 12:00, A0.23
How to compare Dictators?
Abstract

Nickolas Gagnon (AE1, UM)
January 22 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
A Natural Field Experiment Test of Contact Theory (Preliminary Analysis)
Abstract

Elias Tsakas (AE1, UM)
February 26 (MON), 12:00, A1.22
Eliciting prior beliefs
Abstract

Nickolas Gagnon (AE1, UM)
April 10 (TUE), 11:30, H0.04
How Unequal Wages, Unfair Procedures and Discrimination Affect Labor Supply: Experimental Evidence
Abstract

Anna Zseleva (HSE, St. Petersburg)
April 16 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems
Abstract

Giang Tran (AE1, UM)
April 17 (TUE), 12:00, A0.24
Intertemporal Social Preferences
Abstract

Henrik Zaunbrecher (AE1, UM)
April 17 (TUE), 12:30, A0.24
Conflict and Migration: Mobility in Group Contests
Abstract

Anastas Tenev (AE1, UM)
April 23 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Naïve Imitation and Partial Cooperation in a Local Public Good Model
Abstract

Péter Bayer (AE1,UM)
April 23 (MON), 13.00, A1.23
Myopic and Farsighted Players in the Local Public Goods Game
Abstract

Christina Rott (AE1, UM)
April 30 (MON), 12:00, A1.22
Increasing workplace diversity: Evidence from a recruiting experiment at a Fortune 500 company
Abstract

Mehmet Ismail (King’s College London, Department of Political Economy)
May 9 (WED), 13:00-13:45, H0.04
Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases
Abstract

Laura Kasper (UM and Saarland University)
May 25 (FRI), 12:00, C-1.07
Farsighted Rationality
Abstract

Aditya Aradhye (KE, UM)
Jun 6 (WED), 12:00, C-1.05
Sender-receiver stopping games
Abstract

Martin Strobel (AE1, UM)
June 18 (MON), 12:00, A0.23
On the Evolution of Risk Preferences
Abstract

Andrés Perea (KE, UM)
September 25 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Incomplete information and equilibrium
Abstract

Stefan Terstiege (AE1, UM)
October 9 (MON), 12:00, G1.01
Buyer-optimal robust information structures
Abstract

Niels Mourmans (KE, UM)
October 16 (MON), 12:00, A1.22
Reasoning about the Surprise Exam Paradox
Abstract

Jasmine Maes (AE1, UM)
October 31 (TUE), 12:00, A1.23
Approximate sub-game maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games​
Abstract

Mira Fischer (University of Cologne)
November 6 (MON), 14:00, A1.22
Effects of Timing and Reference Frame of Feedback: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Secondary Schools
Abstract

Shashwat Khare (KE, UM)
November 21 (TUE), 12:00, A0.24
Stability in Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences
Abstract

Emel Öztürk (University of Glasgow)
February 13 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
A cloning-consistency characterisation of the plurality rule
Abstract

János Flesch (QE, UM)
February 21 (TUE), 12:00, A1.23
Simplifying optimal strategies in stochastic games
Abstract

Mehmet Ismail (AE1, UM)
March 7 (TUE), 12:00, H0.04
Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive
Abstract

Emre Ergin (AE1, UM)
March 20 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?
Abstract

Henrik Zaunbrecher (AE1, UM)
March 29 (WED), 14:00, A1.22
Social Identity in the Lab: A Horse Race between Different Methods to Induce Social Identity
Abstract

Annika Mueller (University of Groningen)
April 3 (MON), 16:00, A1.23
Improving intergroup relations through actual and imagined contact: A field experiment with Malawian shopkeepers and Chinese migrants
Abstract

Riccardo Saulle (AE1, UM)
April 10 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
Abstract

Samira Hossein Ghorban (Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Iran)
April 18 (TUE), 12:00, A0.24
Multi-games for Decision Making in Multi-environments
Abstract

Veerle Tan-Timmermans (QE, UM)
April 24 (MON), 12:00, A1.22
Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Singleton Congestion Games
Abstract

Dries Vermeulen (QE, UM)
May 1 (MON), 12:00, A0.24
Universality of Nash equilibrium
Abstract

Ernesto Reuben (New York University Abu Dhabi)
May 2 (TUE), 12:00, A1.23
Do snitches get stitches? The role of compensation schemes on the willingness to blow the whistle
Abstract

Kutay Cingiz (AE1, UM)
May 15, 12:00, D0.03
U.S. Presidential Primaries: A Multi-Battle Dynamic-Contest Model
Abstract

Rubén Becerril (Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana de Mexico)
May 22, 12:00, A0.24
Sequential games with incomplete information on the order of turns
Abstract

Stephan Jagau (University of Amsterdam)
May 29 (MON), 12:00, A0.23
Common belief in rationality in psychological games
Abstract

Péter Bayer (AE1, UM)
June 19 (MON), 12:00, A0.24
Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games
Abstract

Andrés Perea (QE, UM)
September 20 (TUE), 12:00, A1.23
Common belief in rationality and incomplete information
Abstract

Swarnendu Chatterjee (QE, UM)
October 18 (TUE), 12:00, A1.23
Frequency based analysis of voting rules
Abstract

Péter Bayer (AE1, UM)
October 31 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
A dynamic model of the immune system and cancer cells
Abstract

Mathias Staudigl (QE, UM)
November 14 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Abstract

Nickolas Gagnon (AE1, UM)
December 13 (TUE), 12:00, E0.04
Contact, Redistribution, Ethnicity and Sorting in the American Southwest
Abstract

Panos Protopapas (University of Lausanne)
February 22 (MON), 12:00, E0.04
Solidarity Properties of Choice Correspondences
Abstract

Amber Heijne (AE1)
March 7 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Psychological and Neural Mechanisms of Stay/Leave Decision Making
Abstract

Anna Zseleva (QE)
April 11 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Catch games: The values depend on set and measure theoretic assumptions
Abstract

Shashwat Khare (QE)
April 18 (MON), 12:00, A0.24
Stability in Matching with Couples having Non-Responsive Preferences
Abstract

Michael E. Rose (University of Cape Town)
May 2 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
The Importance of Informal Intellectual Collaboration with Central Colleagues
Abstract

Elias Tsakas (AE1)
May 9 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Reasonable doubt revisited
Abstract

Laura Kasper (Saarland University)
May 23 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Context dependence in two-sided matching
Abstract

Christian Seel (AE1)
May 30 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
The Reverse War of Attrition
Abstract

Andrés Perea (QE)
June 13 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli’s theorem
Abstract

Andrés Perea (QE, UM)
September 21 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Forward Induction Reasoning versus Equilibrium Reasoning
Abstract

Nickolas Gagnon (AE1, UM)
October 5 (MON), 12:00, C-1.07
With who you work can matter: an experiment on social distance and redistribution
Abstract

Swarnendu Chatterjee (QE, UM)
October 12 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Locating a Public Good on a Sphere
Abstract

Agne Kajackaite (University of Cologne)
October 19, 12:00, A0.23
Lying costs and incentives
Abstract

Mathias Staudigl (QE, UM)
October 26, 12:00, A1.23
Stochastic stability and Large deviations in games
Abstract

Peter Bayer (AE1, UM)
November 2 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Salience models in risk theory
Abstract

Andrzej Baranski (AE1, UM)
November 10 (TUE), 12:00, H0.04
Pre-Distribution: Equity Bargaining with Endogenous Investments
Abstract

Veerle Timmermans (QE, UM)
November 30 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Uniqueness of Equilibria in Atomic Splittable Congestion Games
Abstract

Christian Nauerz (QE, UM)
December 9 (WED), 12:00, D0.03
Local Prior Expected Utility: a basis for utility representations under uncertainty
Abstract

Stefania Innocenti (UNU-MERIT)
December 14 (MON), 12:00, A0.23
Self-efficacy and institutional persistence: a two-armed bandit experiment
Abstract

Felix Albrecht (Uni.Marburg, Uni Bonn)
January 12 (MON), 12:00, A1.22
Individual Norm-Enforcement Patterns
Abstract

Marc Schröder (QE, UM)
February 9 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows
Abstract

Arkadi Predtetchinski (AE1, UM)
March 2 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibria in perfect information games with common preferences at the limit
Abstract

Joyce Delnoij (Utrecht University)
March 9 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Competing first price and second price auctions
Abstract

Bijan Ranjbar-Sahraei (DKE, UM)
March 16 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Exploring Complexities of Social Influence
Abstract

Abhinaba Lahiri (QE, UM)
April 20 (MON), 12:00, A0.23
Strategy-Proof Location of Public Bads in a Two-Country Model
Abstract

Matti Pihlava (University of Turku)
May 6 (WED), 12:00, A1.23
The Finnish corporate network – empirical findings from the boardroom network
Abstract

Emel Öztürk (AE1, UM)
May 8 (FRI), 12:00, H0.04
Laissez-faire versus Pareto
Abstract

Lenka Habětínová (Tilburg)
May 11 (MON), 12:00, A1.23
Charitable Giving, Emotions, and the Default Effect
Abstract

Battal Dogan (University of Lausanne)
May 13 (WED), 12:00, A1.22
Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
Abstract

Christina Rott (AE1, UM)
May 18 (MON), 12:00, A1.22
Not just like starting over: Leadership and revivification of cooperation in groups
Abstract

Christian Nauerz (QE, UM)
June 1 (MON), 12:00, C-1.07
Explaining beliefs in one-shot anti-coordination games
Abstract

Marlis Bärthel (University of Jena)

22 September (MON) 12:00, A0.23
Taxed Matrix Games: Effects on the Expected Transfer
Abstract

Jörg Gross (AE1, UM)

29 September (MON) 12:00, A0.23
Power and Cooperation – How Centralisation of Power Can Solve a Social Dilemma
Abstract

Andreas Reischmann (Heidelberg University)

6 October (MON) 12:00, A.023
The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for Public Good Provision
Abstract

Zsombor Z. Méder (AE1, UM)
20 October (MON) 12:00, A.023
Naiveté and sophistication in games

Thomas Demuynck (AE1, UM)

23 October (THU) 16:00, A.024
Revealed preference with limited consideration
Abstract

Tom Truyts (Saint-Louis University, Brussels)

27 October (MON) 12:00, A1.23
Auctions with Prestige Motives
Abstract

Gyula Seres (Tilburg University)
10 November (MON) 12:00, A1.23
Collusion mechanisms in auctions with private and common values
Abstract

Anna Zseleva (QE, UM)
17 November (MON) 12:00, A0.23
Optimal finitely additive strategies in zero-sum games
Abstract

Kutay Cingiz (AE1, UM)

24 November (MON) 12:00, A1.23
Doing it now, later or never
Abstract

Nikolas Tsakas (Singapore University of Technology and Design)

8 December (MON) 12:00, A0.23
An Experiment on the Unidimensionality of Opinions
Abstract