Greenpeace Nordic: the ECtHR’s Dilemma Between Legal Certainty and Setting a Precedent

Introduction: 

The case Greenpeace Nordic and Others v Norway Judgment revolves around the claim that Norway made procedural mistakes in the licensing process for the exploration for petroleum leading to a failure to uphold its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), namely the right to life under Article 2 ECHR and the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. This case perfectly illustrates the lack of a right to a sound environment under the ECHR but the openness of the Court to find alternative means to guarantee it. As will be shown below, the Court again granted authorities a wide margin of appreciation, while still protecting the environment through procedural safeguards such as permits. As a human rights court, the ECtHR is still anthropocentric in its approach and more vague than it could be. To better understand and critically assess this case, we will first summarise the legal issue and the judgment given by the ECtHR. Building upon this basis, we will then provide a commentary of the case, showing how despite being consistent with the Court’s previous judgments, some criticism can still be addressed.

Substance of the case and core legal problems:

The applicants include six individuals and two non-governmental organisations (NGOs): Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth. The individual applicants, three of which are members of the Sámi indigenous community, were or currently are full members of Young Friends of the Earth and are highly engaged in and concerned with environmental matters.

The case concerns Norway’s petroleum activities whereby the State conducts licensing rounds allowing the exploration of areas in search of petroleum for extraction. Following the opening of the south-east Barents Sea for petroleum activities in April 2013, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy approved in June 2016 ten petroleum production licenses, followed by some exploration wells being drilled, but ultimately, “no profitable gas discoveries were made”. In October 2016, the two NGOs sought a judicial review of the validity of the decision to grant these licenses before the Oslo City Court, claiming the decision was in breach of the constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment and that it was invalid due to procedural errors. The decision was judged to be valid, to which the NGOs appealed, but saw their claim dismissed and again, appealed the case to the Supreme Court. The latter dismissed the appeal leading the NGOs, joined by the individual applicants, to bring the case before the ECtHR, claiming that Norway’s actions were contrary to its obligations under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. 

The applicants submitted that they were exposed to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change due to their vulnerability as young people, translating into physical and mental hardships. The Sámi applicants claimed to carry a heavier burden due to their traditional practices of subsistence and relied on a report by the Saami Council and one by the Norwegian National Human Rights Institution, which both underscored the dangers of climate change in particular against the fragile traditions of the Sámi people. 

The Court started its assessment with preliminary points, mostly linked to its previous landmark case Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, noting that the case at hand concerned a procedural obligation rather than a substantive. Pursuant to KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court dismissed the complaints under Article 2 ECHR as Article 8 ECHR covers the same principles as the former, to a great extent. 

The Court then looked at admissibility, based on KlimaSeniorinnen as specific criteria had been set out on “legal standing in the context of climate change cases”. For individuals to meet the victim status under Article 34 ECHR, they must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change and there must be “a pressing need to ensure [their] individual protection”. Associations must be lawfully established or have standing in the jurisdiction concerned; must “be able to demonstrate they pursue a dedicated purpose […] , whether limited to or including collective action for the protection of [human rights] against threats arising from climate change”; and to be able to demonstrate they are genuinely qualified to represent such affected individuals. Furthermore, an issue falls within the scope of Article 8 ECHR when there is an “‘actual interference’ with the applicant’s enjoyment of his or her private or family life or home”. 

Based on these established criteria, the Court first found a sufficiently close link between the disputed procedure of the licensing and “serious adverse effects of climate change on the lives, health, well-being and quality of life of individuals”. Looking at the victim status of the individual applicants, it firstly found that the three individual applicants that are members of the Sámi people, are not exposed to hardships of “high intensity”. Regarding the overall individuals’ claims, the Court found a lack of support by any medical certificates or any other documents presenting a high intensity of exposure of the applicants to the adverse effects of climate change, nor any “particular morbidity”. This lack of support failed to show an impact on the applicants greater than on other young people living in Norway. Therefore, the criteria for victim status of the individual applicants were not fulfilled. On the other hand, it found the applicant organisations fulfilled the necessary criteria for them to have standing, and that Article 8 ECHR was applicable to their complaint. 

On the merits, the Court established that States are, pursuant to Article 8 ECHR, under an obligation to adopt and apply “regulations and measures capable of mitigating the existing and potentially irreversible, future effects of climate change”. States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation regarding the means to achieve it. Given the procedural nature of the issue at hand, the Court assessed the decision-making process surrounding the licensing of petroleum exploration in question. It held that to assess whether a State remained within its margin of appreciation, it can be particularly helpful to determine the existence of “an adequate, timely and comprehensive environmental impact assessment in good faith and based on the best available science”. Such an assessment must include certain things such as a quantification of the GHG emissions anticipated, the compatibility with national and international law, and must follow a certain timeframe. In accordance with the three consecutive stages framing petroleum activities in Norway, the Court noted that it was the first stage that posed a problem as the applicants challenged the absence of an adequate substantive environmental assessment and, secondly, the Supreme Court’s finding that such an assessment could be delayed to a later stage. The Court agreed that there was a failure to hold a comprehensive environmental assessment. However, in accordance with other procedural safeguards, such a comprehensive assessment would be conducted at the third stage of a project’s approval, including the elements that the applicants found missing. Thus, the Court is satisfied that there are sufficient procedural safeguards, contrary to what the applicants claim, to ensure that petroleum activities do not go against the human rights protected under Article 8 ECHR.

Critical reflection:

To have a clear focus on our case note, the core legal problems assessed here are the continuity of the Court’s assessment and the failure of assessing the individual applicants better. A critical reflection is necessary surrounding this case, since it is the only case on petroleum activities that the ECtHR has thus far looked at. Most comments so far have been rather positive as the judgement has an impact on the permit procedures for fossil fuel. We do agree that this judgement will lead to licences being less likely to be granted. Thanks to this judgment, it is now mandatory to ensure that the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for new projects includes emissions for exported fossil fuel, otherwise leading to a violation. The Court stated that moving forward, an EIA must be adequate, timely, and comprehensive, as well as, based on the best available science and made in good faith. Moreover, the three criteria mentioned above regarding the inclusion of the quantification of the anticipated GHG emissions; the compliance with national and international law obligations on climate change; and the obligation to provide public participation at an early stage; should work together, eventually leading to less permits being granted with public participation also still open. However, in our opinion, the court still could have done more to protect the environment.

This case could have built on the requirements for individuals as described in the KlimaSenirorinnen case and as referred to above. The individual applicants belonging to the Sámi culture did bring reports, such as the findings from the Saami Council in collaboration with the Sámi Parliament and the report from the Norwegian National Human Rights Institution. However, the court merely stated that “it cannot conclude that the hardships that the situation complained about may be causing the three [Sámi] applicants personally are of ‘high intensity’”. No further elaboration was given with a clear dismissal of the reports brought in support of their claims; this is a lost opportunity. This is especially odd as the Court did recognize the vulnerable position of the Sámi people in the same paragraph but did not expand on it. Thus far, no authors or scholars have critically reflected on this part. 

Our intention is not to recommend the Court to be too interventionalist which would lead the Court to go beyond its scope. Also, it is known that the Court grants States a wide margin of appreciation. But how the Court went about this is very wide in our opinion. The fact that Norway was allowed to have the process it did, with only very late consultation seems to go a bit against the system of public participation. Protection in only later stages increases the chance of insufficient protection, which is not what the system intends. This inconsistency of the Court is partially fixed through the requirements surrounding the EIAs as mentioned above, however, the ECtHR could have been harsher on the State.

Positive aspects, however, should also be discussed. The ECtHR, unlike the CJEU, tends to look more frequently at international law. This is also done in this judgement thus showing how this judgement is in line with other international courts and their developments in environmental jurisprudence. This is welcome, as it creates legal certainty, however, it probably also did constrain the ECtHR a bit, since giving more protection unlike other international courts would have actually created legal uncertainty. This is also a difficult balancing act for the Court itself in such judgements.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Court’s decision in this case is a step in the right direction for the protection of the environment, thanks to the requirements set for EIAs. However, though it would have been difficult considering factors as the margin of appreciation and scope, more protection of the environment would have been greatly appreciated. There is much more to say on this case, and a lot more to reflect on, however, we focused on two key issues to properly highlight them and end on this note.

Reference list:                                    

Primary sources:

Greenpeace Nordic and Others v Norway, App No 34068/21 (ECtHR, 28 October 2025)

Secondary sources:

Callewaert J, ‘A judicial, comprehensive and flexible Strasbourg response to climate change: judgment of the ECtHR in Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway’ (Prof. Dr. iur. Johan Callewaert, 12 December 2025) <https://johan-callewaert.eu/the-judicial-comprehensive-and-flexible-strasbourg-answer-to-climate-change-judgment-of-the-ecthr-in-greenpeace-nordic-and-others-v-norway/>

ECHR, ‘Factsheet-Environment and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (ECHR, April 2024) <https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/fs_environment_eng>

Ganesan P, ‘Leaving Out ‘Leaving it in the Ground’: The ECtHR’s Greenpeace Nordic Judgment’ (EJIL: Talk!, 10 November 2025) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/leaving-out-leaving-it-in-the-ground-the-ecthrs-greenpeace-nordic-judgment/>

Greenpeace International, ‘European human rights court sets climate limits for the oil industry’ (Greenpeace, 28 October 2025) <https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/79332/european-human-rights-court-sets-climate-limits-for-the-oil-industry/>

Kaupa C, ‘Greenpeace Nordic and others v. Norway: shedding light on the duties of states regarding new fossil fuel extraction.’ (European Law Blog, 1 December 2025) <https://www.europeanlawblog.eu/pub/23duypxr/release/1>