Online PhD defence Zhilin Xu

Keywords: Bertrand model, Mobile Crowdsensing, Cooperation, Stability

"Strategic Cooperation and Incentive Design in Competitive and Dynamic Environments"

This thesis examines strategic decision-making in settings where individual incentives may conflict with collective efficiency. It studies how cooperation emerges and remains stable under competition, incomplete information, and changing participation. The first part analyzes coalition formation in a Bertrand model with collusion, examining how the number of firms affects stable coalition size, prices, and profits. It shows that collusion can persist in equilibrium as the number of firms increases. The second part investigates cooperation in Mobile Crowdsensing systems through alliance formation and incentive mechanisms. It considers heterogeneous requesters and participants, incomplete information, and participation changes. Incentive mechanisms are developed to align individual incentives with system objectives, and their effects on participation and task completion are analyzed using game-theoretic models. Together, the two parts explore how cooperation arises and persists across different forms of strategic interaction, linking individual incentives to collective outcomes. Overall, it clarifies when cooperation can be sustained despite conflicting incentives.         

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