‘Bulgaria does not need to become the ‘new Hungary’ – this is very much the case already’

The results of the Bulgarian elections from the 19th of April 2026 were surprising in at least two respects. Firstly, the expected winner – the newly formed Progressive Bulgaria of the ex-President Rumen Radev – won much greater share (nearly 45%) of the casted votes than the prognoses of the polling estimates in the week before (maximum 35%). Second, his political opponents remained at great distance behind the winner – at less than 13,5%  – allowing Radev to enjoy majority in Parliament and to single-handedly take over the executive by forming the first non-coalition government for the last 20 years.

This marks an end to the political fragmentation and the muddling through of the recent years in Bulgaria. Yet, the political ideology and policies that Radev’s party will pursue are not as clear and as pronounced as his political victory of last Sunday. In particular, the positions he has taken in foreign policy and specifically with regard to the war in Ukraine could be a reason for concern: were these just election tricks to win the Bulgarian pro-Russian vote which Progressive Bulgaria will abandon once in office, or is this a continuous line in Radev’s political convictions?

Studio Europa spoke to Dr. Elissaveta Radulova – a Bulgarian working as Associate Professor in European Public Policy at FASoS (Maastricht University) – about what the election results mean for Europe and the EU.

  • Why are the Bulgarian elections important for Europe and the EU?

These elections are important because they might mark the beginning of Bulgaria’s eurosceptic presence on the European integration scene. Since its entry to the EU in 2007 Bulgaria was euro-enthusiastic and committed to its full institutional integration into the European political construction. This process was recently ‘crowned’ by the full integration of the country into the Schengen area and the entry into the Eurozone on 1 January 2026. The election victory of ex-president Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria might lead to a ‘euro-cooling’ in Bulgaria’s political positioning regarding foreign policy in particular.

  • What do you expect Brussels reaction to be?

Having celebrated Orbán’s defeat last week, I guess this week Brussels is worried, because they know what positions Radev has been taking when he was President of Bulgaria and when he was representing the country in the European Council (during the numerous times he had to appoint a care-taker government in the past 5 years). For example, in 2023 he was not supportive of the joint fast-track acquisition of one million rounds of artillery munition to replenish the Ukrainian stocks. Back then 17 EU countries and Norway had to sign a separate agreement in order to go ahead and support Ukraine. In one of his pre-election interviews Radev proudly referred to this position and qualified it as a very ‘pragmatic’ long-standing policy line of his, which is now echoed by the newly elected Hungarian leader Péter Magyar, but also the Check Republic and Slovakia.

“The most recent worrying signal Radev issued was the display of his 2019 handshake with Vladimir Putin which his team projected during the closing event of his electoral campaign”

In a similar vein of thought, Brussels probably recalls how last year – not at all by coincidence on the 9th of May 2025 – Radev proposed a referendum on Bulgaria’s plan to adopt the euro per 1 January 2026. Effectively, this was an attempt to sabotage the entry of the country to the Eurozone.

The most recent worrying signal Radev issued was the display of his 2019 handshake with Vladimir Putin which his team projected during the closing event of Progressive Bulgaria’s electoral campaign on 17 April 2026.

This could have been a strategic move to collect last-minute the Russophile and pro-Putin vote, but even so, it is indicative of the pro-Kremlin attitude of Radev, which I suppose worries Brussels very much. I believe therefore that they will watch his first moves as Head of the Executive very closely, and might even prepare for scenarios where they will have to apply conditionality. The strongest instrument in Brussel’s hands in this context is restricting access to the EU-funds (similarly to what was done in the case of Orbán’s Hungary).

  • How will Radev’s government navigate Bulgaria’s role in EU foreign policy, especially regarding Russia, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans?

Well, we had a direct statement about this in the night of the elections from Radev himself when he knew already that he has achieved a landslide victory:

“Bulgaria will pay efforts to continue its European path, but believe me, strong Bulgaria in strong Europe needs critical thinking, needs pragmatism, because Europe has fallen a victim to its own ambition to be a moral leader in a world without rules. So, what Europe needs right now it’s – again – critical thinking, pragmatic actions, and good results especially building a new security architecture, and paying a lot of efforts to recover its industrial power and competitiveness. That will be the main contribution of Bulgaria to its European mission.”

I read between the lines of this statement that Radev and his Ministers will be taking less pro-European integration positions from now on in Brussels, will be the ‘critical thinkers’ around the table, and will be offering ‘pragmatic’ and ‘common sense’ analysis. So, I expect that Radev will put forward arguments of affordability, curbing the increasing burden on the cost-of-living and the like, to advocate for lifting the sanctions against the import of Russian gas to the EU, for example. In other words, I expect that what we will be seeing from him and his government is to present in neutral terms and to dress in ‘pragmatic and common-sensical’ arguments that echo the Kremlin rhetoric.

  • How are other EU countries reacting to Radev’s victory?

As always, the EU member states offer a diversity of responses, but by-and-large the other member states are expressing reserved congratulations and holding their breath in expectations of the first signals Radev’s government will give once in office.

Conversely, the international press is outspoken and very clear in its verdict: pretty much without exception the respected and credible newsagencies qualify Radev as the Russia-friendly, Russia-aligned or pro-Russian. This qualification is fully-justified in my view as I hopefully managed to convince you with the examples stated above.
 

“We do not need to become the ‘new Hungary’ – this is very much the case already”

  • Could Bulgaria become the ‘new Hungary’?

Well, in my view, Bulgaria is already for many years a facade-democracy and a country ruled by economically-powerful and politically entrenched agents of oligarchic circles. So, we do not need to become the ‘new Hungary’ – this is very much the case already (with various country-specific features, of course). But if your question alludes to Radev becoming the new Orbán, then no, I do not think that Radev is going to act like the new Orbán. I think he is going to operate in much more covert and perfidious ways by on the one hand declaring himself and his policies in line with the European ones, but at the same time actively defending theses like “Europe needs peace”, or “we need to be pragmatic about the cost of living”, or “Bulgaria is too poor to support Ukraine”, etc. Such positions on European policy debates effectively work subversively i.e. against furthering and deepening of European integration and hence in direct favour of pro-Kremlin interests. Furthermore, I expect Radev to side with Eurosceptic member states such as Slovakia, and to stand for arguments of the type: “we will not veto or block EU support for Ukraine, but will not cover the costs and share the burdens either…”.