A. Perea y Monsuwé

My research focuses on "epistemic game theory". This field explores how people reason before they make a choice in game-theoretic situations.

Books:

"Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice" (published by Cambridge University Press in 2012)

"Rationality in Extensive Form Games" (published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2001)

Articles:

Perea, A. (2011), An algorithm for proper rationalizability, Games and Economic Behavior 72, 510-525.

Flesch, J. and A. Perea (2011), Strategic disclosure of random variables, European Journal of Operations Research 209, 73-82.

Perea, A. (2010), Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning, Games 1, 168-188.

Driesen, B., Perea, A. and H. Peters (2010), The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion. Accepted for publication in Mathematical Social Sciences.

Driesen, B., Perea, A. and H. Peters (2010), On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games, Theory and Decision 68, 367-391.

Perea, A. (2009), A model of minimal probabilistic belief revision, Theory and Decision 67, 163-222.

Flesch, J. and A. Perea (2009), Repeated Games with Voluntary Information Purchase, Games and Economic Behavior 66, 126-145.

Flesch, J., Karagozoglu, E. and A. Perea (2009), Optimal search for a moving target with the option to wait, Naval Research Logistics 56, 526-539.

Perea, A. (2008), Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction, Mathematical Social Sciences 56, 1-26.

Perea, A. (2007a), Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games, Journal of Economic Theory 136, 572-586.

Perea, A. (2007b), A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies, Synthese 158, 251-271 (Knowledge, Rationality and Action, 341-361).

Müller, R., Perea, A. and S. Wolf (2007), Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility, Games and Economic Behavior 61, 344-358. Eco

Perea, A., Peters, H., Schulteis, T. and D. Vermeulen (2007), Revision of Conjectures about the Opponent's Utilities in Signaling Games, Economic Theory 30, 373-384., 344-

Perea, A. (2006), Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games, International Journal of Game Theory 34, 529-559.

Perea, A., Peters, H., Schulteis, T. and D. Vermeulen (2006), Stochastic Dominance Equilibria in Two-Person Noncooperative Games, International Journal of Game Theory 34, 457-473.

Herings, J.J., Perea, A. and A. Predtetchinski (2006), The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies, International Journal of Game Theory 34, 55-65.

Nicolò, A. and A. Perea (2005), Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining, Mathematical Social Sciences 49, 221-243.

Asheim, G.B. and A. Perea (2005), Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games, Games and Economic Behavior 53, 15-42.

Kranich, L., Perea, A. and H. Peters (2005), Core concepts for dynamic TU-games, International Game Theory Review 7, 43-61.

Perea, A. (2002), A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games, Games and Economic Behavior 40, 322-338.

Barberà, S. and A. Perea (2002), Supporting others and the evolution of influence, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26, 2051-2092. 

Perea, A., Jansen, M. and D. Vermeulen (2000), Player splitting in extensive form games, International Journal of Game Theory 29, 433-450.

Flesch, J. and A. Perea (1999), Repeated games with endogenous choice of information mechanisms, Mathematics of Operations Research 24, 785-794.

Perea, A. and H. Peters (1998), Limit consistent solutions in non-cooperative games, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 98, No. 1, July 1998.

Perea, A., Jansen, M. and H. Peters (1997), Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games, Games and Economic Behavior 21, 238-252.

Perea, A., Jansen, M. and H. Peters (1997), Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games, Journal of Mathematical Economics 27, 425-449.