hart_and_zingales_2022_the_new_corporate_governance.pdf
(335.58 kB, PDF)
… that SWM better represents the preferences of shareholders, explaining both how it should be 5 See, e.g., Mayer (2018) and Edmans (2020), and, for some criticism, Bechuk and Tallarita (2020). 6 For more on this, see Barzuza et al. (2022). 7 The argument for this is standard. Shareholders, as residual income claimants, are the most vulnerable of the … Financial Management, 51, 1, Spring: 227‐269. Barzuza, Michal, Quinn Curtis, and David H. Webber, 2022, “The Millennial Corporation: Strong Stakeholders, Weak Managers”, working paper Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Roberto Tallarita, 2020, “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance”, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 91. Berle, Adolph A. Jr, 1932, “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note,” Harvard Law Review , Vol. 45, No. 8 (June), pp. 1365‐1372 …