“Berlin will be more strict than before": Waarom de nieuwe politieke realiteit van Duitsland een Europees probleem is

The prospect of an AfD-led government in Saxony-Anhalt would also have symbolic and institutional significance, given the political culture Germany developed after 1945:

“What has happened in Saxony-Anhalt is very significant for German politics. If, as expected, there is an AfD prime minister in October, he will speak to the media as a prime minister and become a member of the Bundesrat. German political parties have, in general, defined themselves since the Second World War as cooperative, international, diplomatic and inclusive. All these democratic values are now at stake.”

The expert argues that this development should also be understood in the context of the broader transformation of Germany’s foreign and European policy since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine:

“It was also very pro-European, of course and pro-NATO, pro-UN, pro-international law. The political scientist Hanns Maull called Germany a civilian power that always chooses for diplomatic solutions instead of military solutions – for development and cooperation instead of a gun. All these values are at stake since the Russian invasion in Ukraine.”

For Jürgens, the election in Saxony-Anhalt marks another turning point:

“I think Russian invasion in Ukraine really was a turning point for Germany in the sense that it posed the question, where should Germany be in Europe and how should Germany react on new challenges in Europe? The elections in Saxony-Anhalt are a new turning point, I think, in that sense that threats were always coming from the outside are now also from inside. These are political threats, and that means that Germany will reevaluate its attitude towards Brussels.”

Jürgens notes that the difficulties in the Franco-German relationship are not new, but in recent years they have become more visible in areas ranging from defence and energy to industrial policy:

“The problem is that the idea of a French-German axis might not really fit to reality as we have seen with the development around the Eurofighter, but also energy politics, or air defense. There are many structural differences between France and Germany. Until very recently, there was literally no French-German cooperation on air defense. And it is not yet clear what the German response  to a French offer to cooperate will be.”

These more structural differences are likely to matter in the negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget. Germany has traditionally been part of the group of member states advocating tighter spending, alongside countries such as the Netherlands and Finland. But Jürgens argues that the circumstances facing the EU today are fundamentally different from those of previous budget negotiations:

“Every seven years you see that there is a frugal group of countries, or as they now call themselves stringy six. Germany, The Netherlands, Finland are always part of this group. But the most important issue today is that the EU needs much more money, because its facing much more challenges both eastwards as well as westwards. We still have a year to negotiate on the MFF. How does Brussels do it if Germany will be more strict than ever?”

The debate over the EU budget, Jürgens argues, should not simply reproduce the traditional divide between northern countries seeking to limit spending and southern countries calling for greater investment:

“The real question is what do we need to have a bold and strong Europe in these dangerous times? So what I see is old mechanisms, seven years ago it was the same: the northern countries who wanted to invest less, and southern countries wanted to invest more. Whereas today, we live in another Europe, and in another European Union, and challenges are much bigger.”

He points to the Draghi report on European competitiveness as an example of the scale of the investment challenge facing the EU, particularly in digital infrastructure and industry:

“We need to reread the Draghi report, because I’m not sure everybody read it. We need to invest in a new digital infrastructure, and we need to make Europe more bold and strong again, but in reality, the German chancellor seems to have other priorities.”

Jürgens adds that the domestic political situation may make it even harder for the German government to make compromises at the European level:

“The hesitating policy of Germany was already there. And one might ask if these elections will have a lot of influence on it, but if they have influence, the Germans will be more strict than before and less inclined to give in.”

Looking at the reasons behind the AfD’s success, Jürgens points to domestic economic concerns, especially in eastern Germany. According to the expert, economic stagnation, uncertainty in the automotive sector and rising energy costs have contributed to a sense of insecurity:

“I think there is a huge reaction to domestic economic issues, particularly in Eastern Germany. The German economy is very stable in the last five years in the sense that  there has been no growth, and the transformation of the car industry costs a lot of jobs. So there is a lot of uncertainty. The cost of gas and diesel are also rising a lot.”

The war in Ukraine also plays a role, particularly where AfD – voters see Germany’s support for Ukraine as costly and disconnected from their own concerns:

“Particularly in Eastern Germany there is an idea that the Ukraine war is not our war. That the support for Ukraine costs a lot of money and it’s not helpful for the Germans themselves.”

Jürgens believes that Germany’s established parties have struggled to respond to the AfD’s arguments in a way that addresses voters’ concerns directly. Simply warning voters about the party, he argues, does not answer the underlying questions:

“I think there is a need for explanation, for example that if we don’t support Ukraine, there will be many refugees going to Germany, and that’s exactly not what the AfD wanted to happen. I think that the center parties in Germany are not communicating enough about what the AfD is proposing. They are only talking against them, saying that they are dangerous, that we should exclude them, that there should be a cordon sanitaire against AfD, et cetera, but they’re not saying ‘if you propose not to support Ukraine, these will be the consequences’, for example. There should be much more communication with the arguments of the AfD, and that’s what’s not happening, which has led to a much bigger success of the AfD.”

Despite the scale of the result, Jürgens does not necessarily see the AfD’s current momentum as a permanent transformation of German politics:

“AfD present themselves as a party, which is going up and up and up, but I think they could also go down very easily. The economic situation is changing, the politics are changing and the narrative is changing. So it does not necessarily have to be, in my point of view, a structural development.”

For Jürgens, that challenge extends to the European Union itself. Brussels has long faced criticism for being distant from citizens, and although he believes European institutions have improved their communication, important policy debates remain largely invisible to the public:

“That has, of course, always been a problem that Brussels has been too far away, and perhaps one could say that Brussels is communicating much better than 10 years ago. The state of the union of Ursula von der Leyen is now really news all over Europe, and is also discussed all over Europe.”

The EU’s long-term budget, however, is a different matter:

“Take the Multiannual financial framework – I think not many European citizens are aware of the topicality of this issue, but it’s very important at the moment and there should be much more debate about it.”

He argues that the debate should not only be left to governments and EU institutions. Citizens themselves need to engage with the question of what Europe should invest in, particularly as geopolitical and economic competition intensifies:

“We should also, as citizens of Europe, realize ourselves that it is important to invest in Europe, particularly since the world has become so much more dangerous. And China and the U.S. are investing a lot in the industry.”

That, in turn, requires a broader discussion about Europe’s economic model, the expert underlines:

“The old ideas of Europe that the free market will solve our problems are outdated, and this discussion is not taking place enough in Europe, in all European countries. This is a debate which should take place on a national level, and on the European level.”

For Jürgens, the political debate in Germany and the Netherlands is still too much focused on reducing expenditure rather than discussing where Europe needs to invest for the future:

“I’m disappointed about the politics in Germany, and in the Netherlands in the sense that they are still talking about saving, about having less civil servants, about spare programs, and not about investing in the digital infrastructure and in the real infrastructure or in climate politics, et cetera. Yet these debates are not taking place, whereas it’s very important that they do,” the expert concludes.

Bron: Studio Europa Publiek debat