Forthcoming Articles

Ashkenazi-Golan, G., Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A. & Solan, E.: Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games. Israel Journal of Mathematics.

Drerup, T. H., Wibral, M. & Zimpelmann, C.: Skewness expectations and portfolio choice. Experimental Economics

Flesch, J. & Predtetchinski, A.: A characterization of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays in Borel games of perfect information. Mathematics of Operations Research.

Flesch, J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Sporadic Overtaking Optimality in Markov Decision Problems. Dynamic Games and Applications.

Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., & Suomala, V.: Random Perfect Information Games. Mathematics of Operations Research.

Mackenzie, A. & Trudeau, C.: On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion. Theoretical Economics.


D'Exelle, B., Gutekunst, C. & Riedl, A.: The effect of gender and gender pairing on bargaining: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior &  Organization, 205 (2022), 237-269. 

Doerrenberg, P., Duncan, D. & Löffler, M.: Asymmetric Labor-Supply Responses to Wage Changes: Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market. Labour Economics, 81 (2022), 102305.


Ahrens, S., Bosch-Rosa, C. & Meissner, T.: Intertemporal consumption and debt aversion: a replication and extensionJournal of the Economic Science Association, 8 (2022), 1-2, 56-84.

Ashkenazi-Golan, G., Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., & Solan, E.: Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffsProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119(11) (2022), [e2105867119]. 

Bosmans, K., & Lauwers, L.: Correction to: Lorenz comparisons of nine rules for the adjudication of conflicting claimsInternational Journal of Game Theory (2022). 

Bosmans, K., & Öztürk, Z. E.: Equality and responsibility: ex ante and ex post redistribution mechanisms. Economic Theory, 73(4) (2022), 947-975. 

Bosmans, K., & Ozturk, Z. E.: Laissez-faire versus ParetoSocial Choice and Welfare, 58(4) (2022), 741-751.

Demuynck, T., Seel, C., & Tran, G.: An index of competitiveness and cooperativeness for normal-form games. American Economic Journal-Microeconomics, 14 (2) (2022), 215-239. 

Doğan, G., Glowacki, L., & Rusch, H.: Are strangers just enemies you have not yet met? Group identities, not intergroup relations, shape ingroup bias in three natural groups. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-biological Sciences, 377(1851) (2022), [20210419]. 

Drerup, T.H., Wibral, M. & Zimpelmann, C.: Skewness expectations and portfolio choiceExperimental Economics (2022).  

Elekes, M., Flesch, J., Kiss, V., Nagy, D., Poór, M. & Predtetchinski, A.: Games characterizing limsup functions and Baire class 1 functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 87 (4) (2022), 1459-1473.

Fioretti, M., Vostroknutov, A., & Coricelli, G.: Dynamic Regret AvoidanceAmerican Economic Journal-Microeconomics, 14(1) (2022), 70-93. 

Flesch, J., Herings, P. J-J., Maes, J., & Predtetchinski, A. (2022). Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria in games with almost perfect informationEconomic Theory, 73(2-3) (2022), 695-719. 

Greiff, M. & Rusch, H.: Sharing responsibility for the good. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 101 (2022), 101953.

Gross, J. & Vostroknutov, A.: Why Do People Follow Social Norms? Current Opinion in Psychology. 44 (2022), 1-6.

Kuenn, S., Seel, C., and Zegners, D.: Cognitive performance in remote work - evidence from professional. The Economic Journal, 132 (2022), 643, 1218-1232.

Lois, G., & Riedl, A.: Interplay between different forms of power and meritocratic considerations shapes fairness perceptionsScientific Reports, 12(1) (2022), [11428]. 

Mackenzie, A., & Zhou, Y.: Menu mechanismsJournal of Economic Theory, 204 (2022), [105511]. 

Meissner, T., & Pfeiffer, P.: Measuring preferences over the temporal resolution of consumption uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 200 (2022), [105379]. 

Merguei, N., Strobel, M., & Vostroknutov, A.Moral opportunism as a consequence of decision making under uncertaintyJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 197 (2022), 624-642. 

Micheli, L., Negrini, M., Schuhmann, T. & Riedl, A.: Brain stimulation reveals distinct motives underlying reciprocal punishment and reward. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-biological
 289 (2022), 1986, 20221590.

Negrini, M., Riedl, A., & Wibral, M.: Sunk cost in investment decisionsJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 200 (2022), 1105-1135.

Riehm, T., Fugger. M., Gillen, P., Gretschko. V., & Werner, P.: Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experimentJournal of Public Economics, 212 (2022), 104701. 

Rusch, H.: Heroic behavior: A review of the literature on high-stakes altruism in the wild. Current Opinion in Psychology, 43 (2022), 238-243. 

Rusch, H.: Modelling Behaviour in Intergroup Conflicts: A Review of Microeconomic Approaches. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-biological Sciences, 377(1851) (2022), [20210135]. 

Terstiege, S. & Wasser, C.: Competitive information disclosure to an auctioneerAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14(3) (2022), 622-664. 

Verwoert, M., Ottenhoff, M. C., Goulis, S., Colon, A. J., Wagner, L., Tousseyn, S., van Dijk, J. P., Kubben, P. L. & Herff, C.: Dataset of Speech Production in intracranial ElectroencephalographyScientific data. 9 (1) (2022), 434.


Angrick, M., Ottenhoff, M., Diener, L., Ivucic, D., Ivucic, G., Goulis, S., Saal, J., Colon, A., Wagner, L., Krusienski, D., Kubben, P., Schultz, T., Herff, C.: Real-time synthesis of imagined speech processes from minimally invasive recordings of neural activity. Communications Biology, 4 (1) (2021), 1055. 

Bayer, P., Herings, P.J.J. & Peeters, R. : Farsighted Manipulation and Exploitation in Networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 196 (2021), 105311, 1-36. 

Bosmans, K. & Özturk, Z. E.: Measurement of inequality of opportunity: A normative approachJournal of Economic Inequality, 19(2) (2021), 213-237. 

Cassan, G. & Van Steenvoort, M.: Political regime and COVID 19 death rate: Efficient, biasing or simply different autocracies?An econometric analysis. SSM - Population Health, 16 (2021),100912. 

Csóka, P., & Herings, P. J-J.An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial NetworksManagement Science , 67(5) (2021), 2799-2812.

Dariel, A., Riedl, A. & Siegenthaler, S.: Referral Hiring and Wage Formation in a Market with Adverse SelectionGames and Economic Behavior, 130 (2021), 109-130.

Embrey, M., Hyndman, K., & Riedl, A.: Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 126 (2021), 335-354.

Engl, F., Riedl, A. & Weber, R. A.: Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs. American Economic Journal-Microeconomics. 13 (4) (2021) 261-299.

Flesch, J., Herings, P. J-J., Maes, J., & Predtetchinski, A.: Subgame Maxmin Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Tolerance Levels. Dynamic Games and Applications,11 (2021) 704-737.  

Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., & Sudderth, W.: Discrete stop-or-go games. International Journal of Game Theory, 50(2) (2021), 559-579.

Gross, J., & Vostroknutov, A.: Why Do People Follow Social Norms? Current Opinion in Psychology, 44 (2021), 1-6. 

Guarino, P., & Tsakas, E.: Common priors under endogenous uncertaintyJournal of Economic Theory, 194 (2021), [105254]. 

Herings, P. J-J., & Kóczy, L. A.: The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form gamesGames and Economic Behavior, 127 (2021), 67-79. 

Herings, P.J.J., A. Mauleon, & V. Vannetelbosch: Horizon-K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks,” Games, 12 (2021), 56, 1-13. 

Herings, P.J.J., Peeters, R., Tenev, A.P.  & Thuijsman, F.: Naïve Imitation and Partial Cooperation in a Local Public Goods Model. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 191 (2021), 162-185.

Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.:  Simple Collective Equilibria in Stopping Games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 95, 102467, 1-15.

Herings, P. J-J., Saulle, R. D., & Seel, C.: The Last will be First and the First Last - Segregation in Societies with Relative Payoff ConcernsThe Economic Journal, 131(637) (2021), 2119-2143. 

Lichter, A., Löffler, M., Siegloch, S.: The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East GermanyJournal of the European Economic Association, 19(2), (2021), 741–789.

Lois, G., & Wessa, M.: Honest mistake or perhaps not: The role of descriptive and injunctive norms on the magnitude of dishonesty. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 34(1) (2021), 20-34.

Mackenzie, A.: On atom-swarming and Luce's theorem for probabilistic beliefs. Economic Theory Bulletin, 9(1) (2021), 67-74.

Mendel, M., Pieroth, F., & Seel, C.: Your Failure is My Opportunity - Effect of Elimination in ContestsJournal of Mathematical Economics, 95 (2021), 102495. 

Panizza, F., Vostroknutov, A., & Coricelli, G.: How conformity can lead to polarised social behaviour. PLoS Computational Biology, 17(10) (2021), [1009530]. 

Riedl, A., Rohde, I. M. T., & Strobel, M.: Free neighborhood choice boosts socially optimal outcomes in stag-hunt coordination problemScientific Reports, 11(1) (2021), [7745].

Sandner, M., Zeier, P., Lois, G., & Wessa, M.: Cognitive emotion regulation withstands the stress test: An fMRI study on the effect of acute stress on distraction and reappraisal.  Neuropsychologia, 157 (2021), [107876].

Schleich, J., Faure, C., & Meissner, T.: Adoption of retrofit measures among homeowners in EU countries: The effects of access to capital and debt aversionEnergy Policy, 149 (2021), [112025].

Stroom, M., Kok, N., Strobel, M., & Eichholtz, P. M. A.: Turning up the heat: The impact of indoor temperature on selected cognitive processes and the validity of self-reportJudgment and Decision Making, 16(3), (2021) 766-795. 

Tsakas, E., & Tsakas, N.: Noisy persuasionGames and Economic Behavior, 130 (2021), 44-61. 

Tsakas, E., Tsakas, N., & Xefteris, D.: Resisting persuasionEconomic Theory, (2021)

Zonca, J., Vostroknutov, A., Coricelli, G., & Polonio, L.: Timing of Social Feedback Shapes Observational Learning in Strategic Interaction. Scientific Reports, 11(1) (2021), [21972]. 


Ashkenazi-Golan, G., Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., and Solan, E.: Reachability and Safety Objectives in Markov Decision Processes on Long but Finite HorizonsJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 185 (3) (2020), 945-965.

Böhm, R., Rusch, H., and Baron, J.: The Psychology of Intergroup Conflict: A Review of Theories and Measures. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 178 (2020), 947-962.

Bosch-Rosa, C. and  Meissner, T.: The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses. Experimental Economics (2020). 

Bosmans K: Commentary on “From unidimensional to multidimensional inequality: a review”. Metron, 78 (2020) (1), 47-50.

Brandts, J. and Riedl, A.: Market interaction and efficient cooperation. European Economic Review, 121 (2020), [103318].

Casoria, F., Riedl, A. & Werner, P.: Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations. In Klaus F. Zimmermann (eds.), Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics, Springer, Cham, Switzerland (2020). 

Cingiz, K., Flesch, J, Herings, P.J.J., and Predtetchinski, A. : Perfect Information Games Where Each Player Acts Only Once. Economic Theory, 69 (2020), 965-985. 

Coricelli, G., Polonio, L., and Vostroknutov, A.: The Process of Choice in Games. Handbook of Experimental Game Theory (2020), 69-94. 

Flesch, J. and Predtetchinski, A.: Parameterized games of perfect informationAnnals of Operations Research, 287 (2020), 683-699. 

Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., and Sudderth, W.: Positive zero-sum stochastic games with countable state and action spacesApplied Mathematics and Optimization, 82 (2) (2020), 499-516. 

Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., and Suomala, V.: The doubling metric and doubling measures. Arkiv for Matematik, 58 (2) (2020), 243-266. 

Gagnon, N. and Noussair, C. N.: Reciprocity under brief and long-time delays. Economic Inquiry, 58 (3) (2020), 1517-1530. 

Gürdal, M. Y., Torul, O., and Vostroknutov, A.: Norm compliance, enforcement, and the survival of redistributive institutionsJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 178 (2020), 313-326.

Han, H-J. and Wibral, M.: Organ Donation and ReciprocityJournal of Economic Psychology, 81 (2020),102331.

Heine, F.  and Strobel, M.: Reward and punishment in a team contest. PLOS ONE, 15 (9) (2020), 0236544. 

Herings, P. J-J., Mauleon, A., and Vannetelbosch, V.: Matching with myopic and farsighted players. Journal of Economic Theory,190 (2020), 1-27.

Herings, P.J.J., Meshalkin, A. and Predtetchinski, A.: Optimality, Equilibrium, and Curb Sets in Decision Problems without Commitment. Dynamic Games and Applications, 10 (2020), 489-492. 

Lichter, A., Löffler, M., and Siegloch, S.The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany. Journal of the European Economic Association (2020). 

Lois, G., Schneider, E. E., Kaurin, A., and Wessa, M.; Altered neural responses to social fairness in Bipolar Disorder. NeuroImage: Clinical, 28 (2020),102487.

Mackenzie, A.: An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave. Economic Theory, 69 (3) (2020), 713-743.

Mackenzie, A.: A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation. Games and Economic Behavior, 120 (2020), 512-533. 

Ockenfels, A., Werner, P., and Edenhofer, O.: Pricing externalities and moral behaviourNature sustainability, 3 (10) (2020), 872-877.

Rusch, H. and Gavrilets, S.: The Logic of Animal Intergroup Conflict: A Review. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 178 (2020), 1014-1030 . 

Sandner, M., Lois, G., Streit, F., Zeier, P., Kirsch, P., Wüst, S., and Wessa, M.: Investigating individual stress reactivity: High hair cortisol predicts lower acute stress responses. Psychoneuroendocrinology.
118 (2020), 104660.

Schleich, J., Faure, C., and Meissner, T.: Adoption of retrofit measures among homeowners in EU countries: The effects of access to capital and debt aversion. Energy Policy (2020), 112025.

Terstiege, S. and Wasser, C: Buyer-optimal extensionproof information. Journal of Economic Theory. 188 (2020), 105070.

Tsakas, E.: Robust scoring rules. Theoretical Economics, 15 (2020), 955-587. 

Vostroknutov, A.: Social Norms in Experimental Economics: Towards a Unified Theory of Normative Decision MakingAnalyse & Kritik, 42 (1), 3-39. 



Bayer, P., Herings, P.J.J., Peeters, R., and Thuijsman, F.: Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 105 (2019), 250-264.

Cettolin, E. & Riedl, A.: Revealed Preferences Under Uncertainty: Incomplete Preferences and Preferences for Randomization. Journal of Economic Theory, 181 (2019), 547-585.

Csóka, P., and Herings, P.J.J.: Liability Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 116 (2019), 260-268. 

D'Exelle, B. & Riedl, A.: Gender Inequality and Resource Sharing: Evidence from Rural Nicaragua. Journal of Development Perspectives, 2(1-2) (2020), 62-87.

Demuynck, T., Herings, P.J.J., Saulle, R.D., and Seel, C.: Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Solution in Pure Strategies. Theory and Decision, 87 (2019), 147-154. 

Demuynck, T., Herings, P.J.J., Saulle, R.D., and Seel, C.: The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments. Econometrica, 87 (2019), 111-138. 

Eijkelenboom, G. G., Rohde, I., & Vostroknutov, A.: The impact of the level of responsibility on choices under risk: the role of blame. Experimental Economics, 22(4) (2019), 794-814. 

Feldhaus, C., Sobotta, T. & Werner, P.: Norm Uncertainty and Voluntary Payments in the Field. Management Science, 65(4) (2019), 1855-1866. 

Herings, P.J.J., Mauleon, A., and Vannetelbosch, V.: Stability of Networks under Horizon-K Farsightedness. Economic Theory, 68 (2019), 177-201.  

Karos, D., & Rachmilevitch, S. (2019). The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution. Mathematical Social Sciences, 101 (2019), 107-112. 

Linde, J.: Spaargedrag zelfstandigen kan worden gestimuleerd via keuzearchitectuur. Economisch Statistische Berichten, 104(4777) (2019), 418-419.

Mackenzie, A.: A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms. Theoretical Economics, 14 (2019), 709-778. 

Perea y Monsuwé, A., & Predtetchinski, A.: An epistemic approach to stochastic games. International Journal of Game Theory, 48(1) (2019), 181-203.

Perea y Monsuwé, A., & Tsakas, E.: Limited focus in dynamic games. International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2) (2019), 571-607.

Schleich, J., Gassmann, X., Meissner, T., & Faure, C.: A large-scale test of the effects of time discounting, risk aversion, loss aversion, and present bias on household adoption of energy-efficient technologies. Energy Economics, 80 (2019), 377-393.

Tsakas, E.: Obvious belief elicitation. Games and Economic Behavior, 118 (2019), 374-381.

Werner, P. Riedl, A.: The Role of Experiments for Policy Design. Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Experimental Economics, edited by Arthur Schram and Aljaz Ule.Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2019, 295-311. 



Bonanno, G., & Tsakas, E.: Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 112 (2018), 231-241.

Bosch-Rosa, C., Meissner, T. & Bosch-Domenech, A.: Cognitive Bubbles.  Experimental Economics, 21(1) (2018), 132-153.

Bosmans, K., Decancq, K., and Ooghe, E.: Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics? Theoretical Economics, 13 (2018), 467-484. 

Bosmans, K, Lauwers, L & Ooghe, E.: Prioritarian poverty comparisons with cardinal and ordinal attributes. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120 (2018), 925-942.

Bosmans, K. & Öztürk, Z.E.: An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy. Social Choice and Welfare, 50 (2018), 247-264.

Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J.:  Decentralized Clearing in Financial Networks.  Management Science, 64 (2018), 4681-4699

Demuynck, T. & Seel, C.: Revealed Preference with Limited Consideration. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (2018), 102-131. 

Feldhaus, C., Sobotta, T. & Werner, P.: Reminders for voluntary payments might backfire - Evidence from a field study. Economics Letters, 171 (2018), 133-136. 

Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., & Sudderth, W.: Characterization and simplification of optimal strategies in positive stochastic games. Journal of Applied Probability, 55(3) (2018), 728-741. 

Flesch, J., & Predtetchinski, A.: Parameterized games of perfect information. Annals of Operations Research. (2018)

Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., & Sudderth, W.: Positive zero-sum stochastic games with countable state and action spaces. Applied Mathematics and Optimization. (2018)

Flesch, J., Predtetchinski, A., & Sudderth, W.: Simplifying optimal strategies in limsup and liminf stochastic games. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 251 (2018), 40-56.

de Haan, T. & Linde, J.: ‘Good Nudge Lullaby’: Choice Architecture and Default Bias Reinforcement. Economic Journal, 128 (610) (2018), 1180–1206-

Herings, P.J.J.: Equilibrium and Matching under Price Controls. Journal of Economic Theory, 177 (2018), 222-244.

Herings, P.J.J., Meshalkin, A. & Predtetchinski, A.: Subgame Perfect Equlibria in Majoritarian Bargaining. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 76 (2018), 101-112

Herings, J.J., Peeters, R & Yang, M: Piracy on the internet: Accomodate it or fight it? - A dynamic approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 266 (2018), 328-339.

Mounir, A., Perea y Monsuwé, A., & Tsakas, E.: Common belief in approximate rationality. Mathematical Social Sciences, 91 (2018), 6-16.

Peeters, R. & Tenev, A.: Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 18(3) (2018), 1-4. 

Recalde, M.P., Riedl, A. & Vesterlund. L.: Error-Prone Inference from Response Time: The Case of Intuitive Generosity in Public-Good Games. Journal of Public Economics, 160(2108), 132-147.

Seel, C.: Contests with Endogenous Deadlines. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 27 (2018), 119-133

Terstiege, S.: On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure. Economics Letters, 163 (2018),  83-86.

Tsakas, E.: Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 18(2) (2018), [20160182].


Berg, A.H.J. van den, Herings, P.J.J., & Peters, H.J.M.: The Economic Order Decision with Continuous Dynamic Pricing and Batch Supply. Operations Research Letters, 45 (2017), 371-376

Bos, I., Pot, E. & Peeters, R.: Competition versus collusion: The impact of consumer inertia. International Journal of Economic Theory, 13 (2017) (4), 387-400.

Cettolin, E. & Riedl, A.: Justice under Uncertainty. Management Science, 63 (2017), 11, 3739-3759.

Cettolin, E.,  Riedl, A. & Tran, G.: Giving in the Face of Risk. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 55 (2-3)  (2017), 95–118.​

Cherchye L., Demuynck T., De Rock B., Vermeulen F.: Household consumption when the marriage is stable, American Economic Review, 107 (2017), 1507-1534

Damianov, D.S. & Peeters, R.: On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries. Economics Letters, 150 (2017), 73-76. 

Gaechter, S., Mengel, F., Tsakas, E., & Vostroknutov, A.: Growth and inequality in public good provision. Journal of Public Economics,  150 (2017), 1-13.

Heijne, A., Rossi, F., & Sanfey, A.G.: Why we stay with our partners: Neural mechanisms of stay/leave decision-making. Social Neuroscience. (2017) doi: 10.1080/17470919.2017.1370010. 

Herings, P.J.J., Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.: Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignity and Path Dominance. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 71 (2017), 14-19.

Herings, P.J.J., Meshalkin, A., & Predtetchinski, A.: A One-period Memory Folk Theorem for Multilateral Bargaining Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 103 (2017), 185-198. 

Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Best Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 42 (2017), 427-433. 

Khalmetski, K., Rockenbach, B. & Werner, P.: Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication. Journal of Public Economics, 156 (2017), 59-72. 

Khan, A. & Peeters, R.: Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 82 (2017), 177-194.

Li, X. & Peeters, R.: Rivalry information acquisition and disclosure. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 26 (2017), 610-623.

Linde, J. & Vis, B.: Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs. Political Psychology, 38 (2017), 101–117. doi:10.1111/pops.12335, 

Méder, M., Flesch, J. & Peeters, R.: Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency. Mathematical Social Sciences, 87 (2017), 40-54. 

Meissner, T. & Rostam-Afschar, D.: Learning Ricardian Equivalence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 82 (2017), 273-288.

Negrini, M., Brkić, D., Pizzamiglio, S., Premoli, I., & Rivolta, D.: Neurophysiological Correlates of Featural and Spacing Processing for Face and Non-face Stimuli. Frontiers in Psychology, 8 (2017), 333.

Peeters, R. & Wolk, L.: Eliciting interval beliefs: An experimental study. PLoS ONE, 12 (2017), 4. 

Riedl, A. & Smeets, P.: Why Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible Mutual Funds? Journal of Finance, 72, 6 (2017), available on-line.

Seel, C. & Tsakas, E.: Rationalizability and Nash Equilibria in Guessing Games.  Games and Economic Behavior, 106 (2017), 75-88. 

Sliwka, D. & Werner, P.: Wage Increases and the Dynamics of Reciprocity. Journal of Labor Economics, 35(2) (2017), 299-344. 


Baranski, A.: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(4) (2016), 149-73.

Barbieri, M., Negrini, M., Nitsche, M. A., & Rivolta, D.: Anodal-tDCS over the human right occipital cortex enhances the perception and memory of both faces and objects. Neuropsychologia, 81 (2016), 238-244.

Bosmans K.: Consistent comparisons of attainment and shortfall inequality: a critical examination. Health Economics, 25 (2016), 1425-1432.

Brandts, J., Solà, C. & Rott, C.: Not just like starting over - leadership and revivification of cooperation in groups. Experimental Economics, 19 (2016), 792-818. 

Cingiz, K., Flesch, J., Herings, P.J.J.  & Predtetchinski, A.: Doing It Now, Later, or Never. Games and Economic Behavior, 97 (2016), 174-185. 

Demuynck T., De Rock, B., Ginsburgh, V.: The transfer paradox in Welfare Space. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 62 (2016), 1-4. 

Flesch, J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Refinements of Subgame-Perfect Epsilon-Equilibrium in Games with Perfect Information. Journal of Game Theory, 45 (2016)  523–542.

Flesch, J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Subgame-Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit. Mathematics of Operations Research, 41 (2016) 1208–1221. 

Flesch, J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Subgame-Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Sigma-Discrete Discontinuities. Economic Theory, 61 (2016)  479–495. 

Gross, J., Meder, Z., Okamoto-Barth, S. & Riedl, A.: Building the Leviathan. Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans. Scientific Reports, 6 (2016), 20767.

Harmsen-van Hout, M., Dellaert, B.G.C. & Herings, P.J.J.: Heuristic Decision Making in Network Linking. European Journal of Operational Research, 251 (2016), 158-170.

Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H: The Condorcet Paradox Revisited. Social Choice and Welfare, 47 (2016), 141-186. 

Herings, P.J.J. & A. Predtetchinski: Bargaining under Monotonicity Constraints. Economic Theory, 62 (2016), 221-243. 

Ketel, N., Linde, J., Oosterbeek, H., & van der Klaauw, B.: Tuition Fees and Sunk-cost Effects. Economic Journal, 126 (2016): 2342–2362. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12297

Khan, A., Peeters, R., Thuijsman, F. & Uyttendaele, P.: Network characteristics enabling efficient coordination: A simulation study. Dynamic Games and Applications, 6(4) (2016),  495-519.​

Li, X. & Peeters, R.: Cheap talk with multiple strategically interaction audiences: An experimental study. PLoS ONE 11(10) (2016).

Meissner, T.: Intertemporal consumption and debt aversion: an experimental study. Experimental Economics, 19, 2 (2016), 281-298. 

Mengel, F., Tsakas, E. & Vostroknutov, A.: Past experience of uncertainty affects risk aversion. Experimental Economics, 19 (2016), 151-176.  

Peeters, R., Strobel, M., Vermeulen, D. & Walzl, M.: The impact of the irrelevant: Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in online auctions. Games 7(8) (2016).

Peeters, R., Saran, R., Yüksel, A.M.: Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger’s law. Social Choice and Welfare 47(3) (2016), 729-759.

Riedl, A., Rohde I. & Strobel, M.: Efficient Coordination in Weakest Link Games, Review of Economic Studies, 83, 2 (2016), 737-767.

Schleich, J., Gassmann, X., Faure, C. & Meissner, T.: Making the Implicit Explicit: A Look Inside Implicit Discount Rates. Energy Policy, 97 (2016), 321-331. 

Seel, C. &  Strack, P.: Continuous Time Contests with Private Information. Mathematics of Operations Research, 41 (2016), 1093-1107. 

Terstiege, S.: Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract. Games and Economic Behavior 97 (2016),  70-87. 

Terstiege, S.:  On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers. Economics Letters, 140 (2016), 60-63. 

Tsakas, E.: Correlated-belief equilibrium. Synthese, 193 (2016), 757-779


Bosmans K., Decancq K. & Ooghe, E.: What do normative indices of multidimensional inequality really measure? Journal of Public Economics, 130 (2015), 94-104.

Bosmans, K.  & Esposito, L.: Should fines depend on income? A questionnaire study on values and institutions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 171 (2015), 355-371.

Brandts, J., Groenert, V. & Rott C.: The impact of advice on women's and men's selection into competition. Management Science, 61(5) (2015), pp. 1018 - 1035.

Brink, J.R. van den, Herings, P.J.J., van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J.: The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree. Economic Theory, 58 (2015), 99-123.

Britz, V., Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski. A.: Delay, Multiplicity, and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 61 (2015), 192-202.

Cherchye L., Demuynck T., Hjertstrand P. and De Rock B.: “Revealed preference tests for weak separability: an integer programming approach,” Journal of Econometrics, 186 (2015), 129-141.

Cherchye L., Demuynck T. & De Rock B.: Is utility transferable? A revealed preference analysis. Theoretical Economics, 10 (2015), 51–65.

Cherchye, L., Demuynck, T., De Rock, B. & De Witte K.: Nonparametric analysis of multioutput production with joint inputs. Economic Journal, 124 (2015), 735–775.

Cosaert S., Demuynck T.: Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets. Economic Theory, 59 (2015), 169-200

Demuynck T.:Bounding average treatment effects: a linear programming approach. Economics Letters, 137 (2015), 75-77

Demuynck T.: The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior. Social Choice and Welfare, 42 (2015), 529-549.

Demuynck T.: Statistical inference for measures of predictive success. Theory and Decision, 79 (2015), 689-699

Erkut H., Nosenzo D. & Sefton M.: Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders. Economics Letters, 130 (2015), 28-31.

Gross J., Woelbert E. & Strobel M.: The Fox and the Grapes - How Physical Constraints Affect Value Based Decision Making. PLOS one, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127619 (2015).

Herings, J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Bargaining with Non-Convexities. Games and Economic Behavior, 90 (2015), 151–161.

Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Procedural Fairness and Redistributive Proportional Tax. Economic Theory, 59 (2015), 333-354.  

Karagözoğlu, E. & Riedl, A.: Performance Information, Production Uncertainty and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining. Management Science, 6 (2015), 11, 2611-2626.

Khan, A. & Peeters R.: Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 53 (2015), 28-36.

Lefebvre, M, Pestieau,  P. , Riedl, A. & Villeval, MC.:  Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, International Tax and Public Finance, 22 (2015), 3, 401-425.  

Marino, M. & Parrotta, P.: Self employment: Does parents' cultural diversity matter? Applied Economics Letter 22 (2015), 14.

Peeters, R., Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M.: Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 113 (2015), 1-12.

Potters, J., Riedl, A. & Soetevent, A.: Canon deel 17: Gedragseconomie. Economisch Statistische Berichten, 100 (2015), 4716, 486-490. 

Seel, C.: Gambling in Contests with Heterogeneous Loss Constraints. Economics Letters, 136, 154-157.

Strang, S., Gross, J., Schuhmann, T., Riedl, A., Weber, B. & Sack, A.: Be Nice if You Have to - The Neurobiological Roots of Strategic Fairness, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 10 (2015), 6, 790-796.



Bach, C. & Tsakas, E.: Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, 85 (2014), 48-59.

Bosmans , K.: Distribution-sensitivity of rank-dependent poverty measures, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 51 (2014), 69-76.

Bosmans, K., Decancq, K. & Decoster, A.: The relativity of decreasing inequality between countries. Economica, 322 (2014), 276-292.

Britz, V., Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: On the Convergence to the Nash Bargaining Solution for Action-dependent Bargaining Protocols, Games and Economic Behavior, 86 (2014), 78-183.

Cettolin, E. & Riedl, A.: Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods. Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance: Economic and Political Perspectives, Stan Winer and Jorge Martinez (eds.), Cambridge University Press pp. 300-327.

Csóka, P., and Herings, P.J.J.: Risk Allocation under Liquidity Constraints, Journal of Banking & Finance, 49 (2014), 1-9. 

Gokdemir, O. & Tahsin, E.: Factors that influence the life satisfaction of women living in the Northern Cyprus. Social Indicators Research, 115 (2014) 1071-1085

Gross, J., Woelbert, E., Zimmermann, J., Okamoto-Barth. S., Riedl, A. & Goebel. R.: Value Signals in the Prefrontal Cortex Predict Individual Preferences across Reward Categorie.  The Journal of Neuroscience, 34, 22 (2014), 7580-7586.

Herings, P.J.J.: General Equilibrium and the New Neoclassical Synthesis, Economic Theory, 57 (2014), 437-477.

Hyndman, K., Kraiselburd S. & Watson N.: An Experimental Study of Coordination in Games with Strategic Complementarities: Long Run vs. Short Run Relationships. Production and Operations Management. 23 (2014), 221-238. 

Karagözoğlu, E. & Riedl, A.: Performance Information, Production Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining. Management Science, Articles in Advance (2014), 1–16. 

Khan, A. & Peeters, R.: Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play. International Journal of Game Theory, 43 (4) (2014), 903-924.

Khan, A.: Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation. International Journal of Game Theory, 43 (4) (2014), 721-745.

Lang, M., Seel, C., and Strack, P.: Deadlines in Stochastic Contests, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 52 (2014), 134-142

Mengel, F.: Computer Games and Pro-Social Behaviour, PLoS ONE (2014), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094099

Mengel, F.: Learning by (limited) forward looking players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 108 (2014), 59-77.

Mengel, F. & Sciubba, E.: Extrapolation and Structural Similarity in Games. Economics Letters, 125(3), (2014), 381-385

Parrotta, P., Pozzoli, D. & Pytlikova, M.: Labor Diversity and Firm Productivity? European Economic Review, 66 (2014), 144-179.

Parrotta, P., Pozzoli, D. & Pytlikova, M.: The Nexus between Labor Diversity and Firm Innovation. Journal of Population Economics, 27(2) (2014), 303 − 364.

Seel, C.: The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions, Games and Economic Behavior, 86 (2014), 330-338.

Seel, C. and Wasser, C.: On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions. Economics Letters, 124 (2014), 211-214.

Tausch, F., Potters, J. & Riedl, A.: An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection.  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 48, 2 (2014) 167-186.

Tsakas, E.: Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies. Games and Economic Behavior, 86 (2014), 126-144.

Tsakas, E.: Rational Belief Hierarchies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 51 (2014), 121-127.

Tsakas, E.: Universally rational belief hierarchies. International Game Theory Review, 16 (2014), 1440003.


Attanasi, G. , Casoria, F., Centorrino, S. & Urso. G.: Cultural tourism, local development and instantaneous social capital: a case study of a gathering festival in the South of Italy. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 47 (2013), 228-247.

Bos, I., Peeters, R. & Pot, E.: Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms? Applied Economics Letters,  20(6) (2013), 611-614.

Bosmans, K. & Ooghe, E.: A characterization of maximin. Economic Theory Bulletin, 1 (2013), 151-156.

Britz, V., Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: A Bargaining Theory of the Firm. Economic Theory, 54 (2013), 45-75.

Can, B. & Storcken, T.: Update Monotone Preference Rules. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2 (2013), 136-149.

Casoria, F. & Riedl, A.: Experimental Labor Markets and Policy Consideration: Incomplete Contracts and Macroeconomic Aspects. Journal of Economic Surveys.27(3) (2013), 398–420.

Cherchye,  L., Demuynck, T. & De Rock, B.: The empirical content of Cournot competition. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (2013), 1552-1581.

Cherchye, L., Demuynck, T. & De Rock, B.:  Nash bargained consumption decisions: a revealed preference analysis. Economic Journal, 123 (2013), 195-235.  

D’Exelle, B. & Riedl, A.: Resource Allocations and Disapproval Voting in Unequal Groups. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57, 4 (2013), 627-652.

De Silva, D.G., Kosmopoulou, G., Pagel, B. & Peeters, R.: The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs.Review of Industrial Organization, 42 (3) (2013), 321-343.

Demuynck T.: A mechanism for eliciting the mean and quantiles of a random variable. Economics Letters., 121 (1) (2013), 121-123.

Demuynck, T. & Vandenbossche, J.: Network formation with heterogeneous agents and absolute friction, Computational Economics, 42 (2013), 23-45.  

Demuynck, T. & Verriest, E.: I’ll never forget my first cigarette: a revealed preference analysis of the ‘habits as durables’model. International Economic Review, 54 (2013), 717-738.  

Goeree, J., Riedl, A. & Ule, A.: In Search of Stars: Network Formation Among Heterogeneous Agents. M.O. Jackson and Y. Zenou (eds.), Economic Analyses of Social Networks, Vol. II (2015), chapter 24, 2013, Edgar Elgar Publishing (reprint of Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 2, 2009, 445-466).

Habis, H., &  Herings, P.J.J.: Stochastic Bankruptcy Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 42 (2013), 973-988.

Harmsen-van Hout, M.J.W., Herings, P.J.J. & Dellaert, B.G.C.: Communication Network Formation with Link Specificity and Value Transferability. European Journal of Operational Research, 229 (2013), 199-211.

Hatfield, J., Kominers, S., Nichifor, A., Ostrovsky, M.  & Westkamp, A.: Stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks, Journal of Political Economy,121 (2013), 966-1015 (online appendix).

Hyndman, K., Kraiselburd, S. & Watson, N.: Aligning Capacity Decisions in Supply Chains When Demand Forecasts Are Private Information: Theory and Experiment. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. 15 (2013), 102–117

Lefebvre, M., Pestieau, P., Riedl, A. &  Villeval, M.: Les comportements vis-à-vis de la fraude fiscale et de la fraude sociale diffèrent-ils? Une expérience menée en Belgique, en France et aux Pays-Bas, Économie et Prévision, 202-203 (2013), 147-165.

Loog, B., Dohmen, T. & Vendrik, M.: The scope for increasing total hours worked. De Economist, 161(2) (2013), 157-174.

Peeters, R. & Vorsatz, M.: Immaterial rewards and sanctions in a voluntary contribution experiment, Economic Inquiry, 51 (2) (2013), 1442-1456.

Peeters, R., Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M.: Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(2) (2013), 508-548.

Pot, E., Flesch, J., Peeters, R. & Vermeulen, D.: Dynamic competition with consumer inertia. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49 (2013), 355-366.

Reuben, E. & Riedl, A.: Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations. Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 1 (2013), 122-137.

Seel, C. & Strack, P.: Gambling in Contests, Journal of Ecocomic Theory, 148 (2013), 2033-2048.

Tausch, F., Potters, J. & Riedl, A.: Preferences for Redistribution and Pensions: What Can We Learn from Experiments? Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 12, 3 (2013), 298-325.

Tsakas, E.: Pairwise epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability. Mathematical Social Sciences, 66 (2013), 379-384.

Vendrik, M.: Adaptation, anticipation and social interaction in happiness: An integrated error-correction approach. Journal of Public Economics, 105 (2013),  131-149.

Vostroknutov, A.: Preferences over consumption and status. Theory and Decision, 74(4) (2013), 509-537.

Woelbert, E. & Goebel, R.: Temptations in Economic Decision Making: Effects of Immediate Reward and Reward-cues. Neuroscience and Neuroeconomics, 2 (2013), 11-19.


Berg, A.H.J. van den, Bos, I., Herings, P.J.J. & Peters, H.J.M.: Dynamic Cournot duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (2012), 174-192.

Bochet, O., Ilkilic, R., Moulin, H. & Sethuraman, J.: Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints. Theoretical Economics, 7 (2012), 395-423.

Bochet, O. & Gordon, S.: Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (2012), 52-67.

Can, B. & Klaus, B.: Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets. Social Choice and Welfare, DOI 10.1007/s00355-012-0708-9 (2012).

Can, B. & Storcken, T.: Impossibilities with Kemeny Updating. Economics Letters, Elsevier, 116(2) (2012), 229-23,

Celen, B. & Hyndman, K.: An Experiment of Social Learning With Endogenous Timing. Review of Economic Design, 16(2-3) (2012), 251-268.

Celen, B. & Hyndman, K.: Social Learning through Endogenous Information Acquisition: An Experiment. Management Science, 58 (8) (2012), 1525-1548.

Dumludag, D.: Life Satisfaction and Income Comparison Effects in Turkey. Social Indicators Research, DOI 10.1007/s11205-012-0197-3 (2012).

Ehrblatt, W., Hyndman, K., Ozbay, E. & Schotter, A.: Convergence: An Experimental Study of Teaching and Learning in Repeated Games. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(3) (2012), 573-604.

Engelmann D, Strobel M: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of an Anomaly. Games and Economic Behavior, 76 (2012), 678-689.

Fett, A.K., Shergill, S.S., Joyce, D.W., Riedl, A., Strobel, M., Gromann, P.M. & Krabbendam, L.: To Trust or Not to Trust: The Dynamics of Social Interaction in Psychosis. Brain, 135 (2012), 3, 976-984.

Gossner, O. & Tsakas, E.: Reasoning-based introspection. Theory and Decision, 73 (2012), 513-523.

Grigorieva, E., Herings, P.J.J., Müller, R. & Vermeulen, D.: Fraction Auctions: The Tradeoff between Efficiency and Running Time. European Journal of Operational Research, 220 (2012), 577-587.

Grimm, V. & Mengel, F.: An Experiment on Learning in a Multiple Games Environment. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6) (2012), 2220-2259.

Hawes, D.R., Vostroknutov, A. & Rustichini, A.: Experience and abstract reasoning in learning backward induction. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6 (2012), 23.

Herings, P.J.J., & Polemarchakis, H.M.:  Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market Is Incomplete: An Example. International Journal of Economic Theory, 8 (2012), 139-147.

Herings, P.J.J & Predtetchinski, A.: Sequential Share Bargaining. International Journal of Game Theory, 41 (2012), 301-323.

Horvath, G., Kovarik, J. & Mengel, F.: Limited Memory can be Beneficial for the Evolution of Cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 300 (2012), 193-205.

Hyndman, K., Ozbay, E., Schotter, A. & Ehrblatt, W.: Belief formation: An experiment with outside observers. Experimental Economics, 15 (1) (2012), 176-203.

Hyndman, K., Ozbay, E., Schotter, A. & Ehrblatt, W.: Convergence: An experimental study of teaching and learning in repeated games. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10 (3) (2012), 573-604.

Hyndman, K., Ozbay, E. & Sujarittanonta, P.: Rent Seeking With Regretful Agents: Theory and Experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.  84 (2012), 866-878.

Leufkens, K., Peeters, R.  & Vorsatz, M.: An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol. 12 (2012), iss. 1 (Contributions), article 2.

Lohmann, E., Borm, P. & Herings. P.J.J.: Minimal Exact Balancedness. Mathematical Social Sciences, 64 (2012), 127-135.

Méder, Z.Z., Flesch, J. & Peeters, R.: Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons. Operations Research Letters, 40(6) (2012), 469-474.

Méder, Z., Simonovits, A. & Vincze, J.: Tax morale and tax evasion: social preferences and bounded rationality. Economic Analysis and Policy, 42/2 (2012), 171-188.

Mengel, F.: Learning Across Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (2) (2012), 601-619.

Mengel, F.: On the Evolution of Coarse Categories. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 307 (2012), 117-124.

Mengel, F. & Rivas, J.: An Axiomatization of Simple Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not observed, BE-Journal of Theoretical Economics, 12 (2012).

Montizaan, R. & Vendrik, M.: Misery Loves Company: Exogenous Shocks in Retirement Expectations and Social Comparison. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 6863, IZA, Bonn.

Peeters, R. & Wolk, L.: The role of monetary incentives in prediction markets: A time series approach. Journal of Prediction Markets, 6 (2) (2012), 47-58.

Riedl, A.: Experimenteel economisch onderzoek naar bijdragen aan het publieke goed in een brede Nederlandse populatie: Nederlanders straffen niet-coöperatief gedrag als het niet te duur is. Samenwerking in sociale dilemma's (boekuitgave van Mens en Maatschappij), vol. 87 (2012), 73-102. Amsterdam University Press.

Riedl, A. & van Winden, F.: Input versus output taxation in an experimental international economy. European Economic Review, 56 (2) (2012), 216-232.

Saran, R. & Serrano, R.: Regret matching with finite memory. Dynamic Games and Applications, 2(1) (2012), 160-175.

Vostroknutov, A.: Non-probalistic Decision Making with Memory Constraints. Economics Letters, 117 (2012), 303-305.

Vostroknutov, A., Tobler, P. & Rustichini, A: Causes of Social Reward Differences Encoded in Human Brain. Journal of Neurophysiology, 107 (2012), 1403-1412


Bloch, F., Herings, P.J.J., Klaus, B. & Wooders, M.: Introduction to the coalition theory special issue. Journal of Public Economic Theory 13 (2011), 883-884.

Bochet, O., Klaus, B. & Walzl, M.: A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics 74 (2011), 84-98.

Csóka, P, Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á.: Balancedness conditions for exact games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 74 (2011), 41-52.

Csóka, P, Herings, P.J.J., Kóczy, L.Á., Pintér, M.: Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility. European Journal of Operational Research 209 (2011), 57-62.

Bosmans, K., Esposito, L. & Lambert, P.J.: New perspectives on a more-or-less familiar poverty index. Social Choice and Welfare 36 (2011), 241-247.

Bosmans, K. & Lauwers, L.: Lorenz comparisons of nine rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims. International Journal of Game Theory 40 (2011), 791-807.

Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B.: Corrigendum to ‘Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems’. International Journal of Game Theory 40 (2011), 281-287.

Fosco, C. & Mengel, F.: Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35 (2011), 641-658.

Grigorieva, E., Herings, P.J.J., Müller, R. & Vermeulen, D.: Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations. Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (2011), 541-544.

Grimm, V. & Mengel, F.: Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games. Economics Letters 111 (2011), 113-115.

Grimm, V. & Mengel, F.: Matching technology and choice of institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 78 (2011), 333-348.

Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J.: Core concepts for incomplete market economics. Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (2011), 595-609.

Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J.: Transferable utility games with uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011), 2126-2139.

Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria. Economics Letters 11 (2011), 243-246.

Ilkilic, R.: Networks of common property resources. Economic Theory 47 (2011), 105-134.

Kirchkamp, O. & Reiss, P.: Out-of-equilibrium bids in auctions – Wrong expectations or wrong bids? Economic Journal, 121 (557) (2011), 1361-1397.

Klaus, B.: Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommates markets. Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2011), 172-186.

Klaus, B., Klijn, F. & Walzl, M.: Farsighted stability for roommate markets. Journal of Public Economic Theory 40 (2011), 921-933.

Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R.: Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments. I29 (2011), 134-153.

Mengel, F. & Peeters, R.: Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011), 143-148.

Okamoto-Barth, S., Moore, C., Barth, J., Subiaul, F. & Povinelli, D. J.: Carry-over effect of joint attention to repeated events in young children and chimpanzees. Developmental Science, 14 (2011), 440-452.

Predtetchinski, A.: One-dimensional bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2011), 526-543.

Saran, R.: Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle. Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011), 1712-1720.

Saran, R.: Bilateral trading with naïve traders. Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2011), 544-557.

Tsakas, E.: Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet. International Journal of Game Theory 40 (2011), 111-117.

Tsakas, E. & Voorneveld, M.: On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol. Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (2011), 733-739.


Bochet, O. & Sakai, T.: Secure implementation in allotment economics. Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010), 35-49.

Bochet, O. & Maniquet, F.: Virtual Nash implementation with admissible supports. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (2010), 99-108.

Bosmans, K. & Cowell, F.A.: The class of absolute decomposable inequality measures. Economics Letters 109 (2010), 154-156.

Britz, V., Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), 1951-1967.

Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A. & Vostroknutov, A.: Experience and insight in the race game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 75 (2010), 144-155.

Grigorieva, E., Herings, P.J.J., Müller, R. & Vermeulen, D.: On the fastest Vickrey algorith. Algorithmica 58 (2010), 566-590.

Haake, C.J. & Klaus, B.: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Theory and Decision 96 (2010), 537-554.

Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J.: A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games. International Game Theory Review 12 (2010), 407-416.

Herings, P.J.J., van der Laan, G., Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.: The average tree solution of cooperative games with communication structure. Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010), 626-633.

Herings, P.J.J., Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.: Coalition formation among farsighted agents. Games 1 (2010), 286-198.

Herings, P.J.J. & Peeters, R.: Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory. Economic Theory 42 (2010), 119-156.

Herings, P.J.J., Peeters, R. & Yang, M.: Competition against peer-to-peer networks. Information Economics and Policy 22 (2010), 315-331.

Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A.: One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), 189-215.

Kayi, C. & Ramaekers, E.: Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems. Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010), 220-232.

Klaus, B.: The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Contributions 10 (2010), Art. 14.

Klaus, B. & Klijn, F.: Smith and Rawls share a room: Stability and medians. Social Choice and Welfare 35 (2010), 647-667.

Klaus, B., Klijn, F. & Walzl, M.: Stochastic stability for roommates markets. Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), 2218-2240.

Klaus, B., Klijn, F. & Walzl, M.: Farsighted house allocation. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (2010), 817-824.

Klaus, B. & Nichifor, A.: Consistency for one-sided assignment problems. Social Choice and Welfare 35 (2010), 415-433.

Leufkens, K., Peeters, R. & Vermeulen, D.: Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies. Economics Letters 109 (2010), 139-141.

Reiss, P. & Schöndube, J.R.: First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model. Economic Theory 43 (2010), 99-141.

Riedl, A.: Behavioral and experimental economics do inform public policy. FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 66 (2010), 65-95.


Bochet, O. & Putterman, L. : Not just babble : Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment. European Economic Review 53 (2009), 309-326.

Bosmans, K., Lauwers, L. & Ooghe, E.: A consistent multi-dimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009), 1358-1371.

Bosmans, K. & Chokkaert, E.: Equality preference in the claims problem: a questionmaire study of cuts in earnings and pensions. Social Choice and Welfare 33 (2009), 533-557.

Brandts, J., Riedl, A. & van Winden, F.: Competitive rivalry, social disposition and subjective well-being: An experiment. Journal of Public Economics 93 (2009), 1158-1167.

Csóka, P, Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á.: Stable allocations of risk. Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2009), 266-276.

Goeree, J., Riedl, A. & Ule, A.: In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents. Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2009), 445-466.

Grimm, V. & Mengel, F.: Cooperation in viscuous populations – Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009), 202-220.

Haake, C.J. & Klaus, B.: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. Economic Theory 41 (2009), 393-410.

Herings, P.J.J. & Konovalov, A.: Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-competitive. Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009), 43-58.

Herings, P.J.J., van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J.: Equilibria with coordination failures. Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009), 23-37.

Herings, P.J.J., Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V.: Farsightedly stable networks. Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2009), 526-541.

Herings, P.J.J., Müller, R. & Vermeulen, D.: Bisection auctions. ACM SIGecom Exchanges 8 (2009), 1-5.

Calvó-Armengol, A. & Ilkilic, R.: Pairwise stability and Nash equilibria in network formation. International Journal of Game Theory 38 (2009), 51-79.

Kirchkamp, O. & Reiss, P.: Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction. European Economic Review 53 (2009), 153-169.

Klaus, B.: Fair marriages: An impossibility. Economics Letters 105 (2009), 74-75.

Klaus, B. & Klijn, F.: Employment by lotto revisited. International Game Theory Review 11 (2009), 181-198.

Klaus, B., Klijn, F. & Nakamura, T.: Corrigendum: Stable matchings and preference of couples. Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009), 2227-2233.

Klaus, B. & Walzl, M.: Stable many-to-many matching with contracts. Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009), 422-434.

Kosfeld, M., Okada, A. & Riedl, A.: Institution formation in public good games. American Economic Review 99 (2009), 1335-1355.

Mengel, F.: Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 19 (3), (2009), 397-415.

Peeters, R. & Strobel, M.: Pricing behavior in asymmetric markets with differentiated products. International Journal of Industrial Organization 27 (2009), 24-32.

Predtetchinski, A.: A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence. Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009), 950-958.

Reuben, E. & Riedl, A.: Public good provision and sanctioning in privileged groups. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009), 72-93.

Tsakas, E. & Voorneveld, M.: The target projection dynamic. Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2009), 708-719.

Ule, A., Schram, A., Riedl, A. & Cason, T.: Indirect punishment and generosity toward strangers. Science 326 (2009), 1701-1704.

Publications MPE

  • Forthcoming Articles

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