See Learning Outcomes and Competences
Doelstellingen van dit vak
In this course emphasis is put on the positive aspects of public decision making. In contrast to the normative model no benelovent dictator is assumed. Rather, as in real life, self- and socially interested citizens, bureaucrats and politicians are the economic agents. By using theory, and field empirical evidence policy outcomes in democrasies are discussed. Emphasis will be given to such important areas as pension systems, health insurances, and global threats as international terrorism and climate change. Particpants in this course will learn to use theory and empirical evidence to analyze and interpret the particular problems of collective decision making in democracies and how it may influence and explain real world outcomes ranging form impasse in social security reform efforts to determinants leading to (non-)ratification of international agreements.
Knowledge of microeconomics from a master's level course, including game theory concepts such as Nash Equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium, is required. The ideas developed in the course are related to the concepts introduced in the course Public Policy Evaluation, though neither of these is a strict prerequisite for the other.
Persson, T. and Tabellini (2000). Political economics: Explaining economic policy. Mit press, selected articles.