Dynamic Game Theory
Full course description
Dynamic Game Theory introduces the students to non-cooperative games and dynamic games. The games treated in this course are games in which the players are acting as strategic decision makers, who cannot make binding agreements to achieve their goals. Therefore each player may apply treats to establish a stable outcome. Such games have strong relations with population dynamics, which will be used as an example in this course. The following games will be, among others, treated in this course: matrix and bi-matrix games, repeated games, Stackelberg games, differential games, specific models of stochastic games and evolutionary games. Students will learned the essential solution concepts like “value” and “optimal strategies” for zero sum games, and the concept of “equilibrium” for non-zero sum games. In the evolutionary models the “evolutionary stable strategy” and the “replicator dynamics” will be examined. After completing this course the student will be able to apply their knowledge of games in a wide variety of domains. The student will be able to judge which model is best suited to express a certain strategic situation, while keeping in mind the (im) possibilities and accuracies for deriving solutions.