Tsakas, E., & Tsakas, N. (2021). Noisy persuasion. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 44-61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.001

Tsakas, E., Tsakas, N., & Xefteris, D. (2021). Resisting persuasion. Economic Theory, 72(3), 723-742. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01339-0

Guarino, P., & Tsakas, E. (2021). Common priors under endogenous uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 194, [105254]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105254

Tsakas, E. (2020). Robust scoring rules. Theoretical Economics, 15(3), 955-987. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3557

Tsakas, E. (2019). Obvious belief elicitation. Games and Economic Behavior, 118, 374-381. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.002

Perea y Monsuwé, A., & Tsakas, E. (2019). Limited focus in dynamic games. International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2), 571-607. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0642-x

Tsakas, E. (2019). Obvious belief elicitation. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda No. 001 https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2019001

Zderic, A., Kiskini, A., Tsakas, E., Rivera, C. A., Zondervan, E., Kiss, A. A., Lakerveld, R., & Ozkan, L. (2019). Giving added value to products from biomass: the role of mathematical programming in the product-driven process synthesis framework. 1591-1596. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818634-3.50266-6

Bonanno, G., & Tsakas, E. (2018). Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 112(November 2018), 231-241. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003

Tsakas, E. (2018). Robust scoring rules. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda No. 023 https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2018023