Current Projects
- The Indonesian Presidency: a constitutional analys
- Conditions of Efficient Parliamentary Scrutiny in
- Government Coalition Building in a Comparative Perspective
- Informal Networks of Market Regulators and Parliamentary Control
- Parliamentary Accountability for European Policy
- Parliamentary Immunity in a Comparative Perspective
- Parliaments and Independent Agencies
- The Investigative Powers of the European Parliament
- Parliamentary Investigations in a Comparative Perspective
The Indonesian Presidency: a constitutional analysis of the executive’s powers in Indonesia,
The Indonesian Presidency: a constitutional analysis of the executive’s powers in Indonesia, in comparison with Malaysia and the Philippines, by Rosa Ristawatti. In this PhD project Rosa Ristawatti will thoroughly describe and analyze the powers of the Indonesian president, under the present Indonesian constitution. That part of the project will be of great value to the study of Indonesian constitutional law and the development of democracy as well as a good assessment of the powers of the executive, also in relation to parliamentary control. The study of the powers of the executive in Indonesia will be put into an ‘Asian’ perspective, whilst comparing them to the constitutional structures of Malaysia and the Philippines.
Conditions of Efficient Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU affairs after Lisbon
The Lisbon Treaty has provided the national parliaments with a potential to play a greater role at EU-level politics. Nevertheless, it is yet to be seen how the national legislatures will in practice adapt to the new provisions and translate them into tangible influence. This project focuses on the transformation of the conditions of efficient parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs after the Treaty of Lisbon. The study will also shed light onto the development of the EU polity and the Europeanization process. Drawing on the experience of Sweden, Czech Republic and Romania, the research will concentrate on the relations of the EU Affairs Committees and sectoral committees, engagement of opposition parties in the EU affairs scrutiny and the role of administrative players (members of secretariats, parliamentary experts, etc.) within the national legislatures. This four-year Ph.D. project, launched in October 2010 and funded by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, is carried out by Alexander Strelkov.
Government Coalition Building in a Comparative Perspective
Dutch elections are characterised by a structural lack of result, one Dutch politician famously said the 1970s. This statement is still very much up-to-date. There are hardly any formal rules for the process that leads from parliamentary elections to a new cabinet in the Netherlands. Every formation of a new governing coalition has its own dynamics. At the same time, the process is characterized by a body of informal rules. What exactly are these "rules of the game?" This project attempts to further analyze the formation process of the Dutch cabinet. It seems clear that "four P's" have to be determined: which political parties are taking part in the formation of a new cabinet, what programme can they agree on, which party gets which portfolio, and which persons are to be appointed minister? In order to better understand this process, the project will also take a comparative perspective. As other European parliamentary systems have their own ways of forming a new government, the Dutch case is compared to a number of other countries to examine questions such as: why is it that the German formation process takes much less time, or why is is that minority coalitions seem to work well in Sweden or Denmark? This three-year Ph.D. project, funded by the Montesquieu Institute, started in 2009 and is carried out by Peter Bootsma.
Informal Networks of Market Regulators and Parliamentary Control
In the last decades, the role of International Informal Networks of Market Regulators (IINMR’s) has experienced a substantial growth. The rules governing the world’s financial markets can frequently be traced to the meetings of these networks rather than to national government institutions such as cabinets, parliaments or courts. Whereas it is true that IINMR’s provide a lot of technical expertise in the rulemaking procedures, it is nevertheless clear that they often regulate outside of the traditional channels of democratic oversight and accountability. This project analyzes the democratic deficits of three IINMR’s operating in the fields of banking, securities and insurance (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS), on the basis of certain quantitative and qualitative indicators, as well as the responses that three jurisdictions (Spain, the UK, the US) provide in terms of parliamentary control over the IINMR’s and their members. The purpose of the project is, firstly, to understand why IINMR’s democratic deficits justify parliamentary intervention and, secondly, to analyze the differences in parliamentary control over the networks in different jurisdictions as well as the relations between the instruments of oversight and different constitutional models of government. On the basis of these results, some policy proposals will be suggested. This three-year postdoctoral research project, conducted by Pablo Iglesias Rodriguez, started in 2009 and is funded by the Montesquieu Institute.
Parliamentary Accountability for European Policy
Starting in 2009, Philipp Kiiver will carry out a three-year research project into different forms of parliamentary accountability. The project is financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) through a VENI grant for talented postdoctoral researchers. The project aims to investigate whether national parliaments can use accountability methods that have been previously associated with non-parliamentary institutions, such as courts of auditors or the judiciary. This is investigated by means of an empirical study of how national parliaments review European legislative proposals, and how they interact with the European Commission in that context.
Parliamentary Immunity in a Comparative Perspective
Parliamentary immunity, defined as the full or partial immunity of members of parliament from measures of investigation or prosecution for civil or criminal matters, is known to virtually all (national) parliaments. Its purpose is to safeguard the proper functioning of parliament by enabling it to discharge its tasks without undue influence of interference by, especially, the executive and judiciary. Systems of parliamentary immunity differ significantly in terms of legal design, characteristics and scope: while in some systems protection is limited to freedom of speech in parliament, parliamentarians in other systems may not, in principle, be prosecuted even for serious crimes without prior authorization by the assembly of which they are members. Even though there is broad consensus among scholars and throughout legal systems that parliamentary immunity is an important institution without which parliaments would not, or not to a sufficient degree, be able to discharge their constitutional functions in a democratic system, it is also alleged that immunity facilitates corruption, libel and slander within the ranks of parliament and may, at times, even infringe upon human rights of citizens. The question is, therefore, how systems of parliamentary immunity are best designed. A comparative study of the systems of parliamentary immunity of the UK, France, the Netherlands and the European parliament will explore a variety of legal options and seek to establish a catalogue of minimum and maximum requirements for the organization of a system of immunities. This four-year Ph.D. project, funded by Maastricht University's Faculty of Law, has started in 2009 and is carried out by Sascha Hardt.
Parliaments and Independent Agencies
Currently, there are around 40 European agencies. All these bodies were created on a different treaty basis, delegated with different functions and status and the involvement of the EU institutions in operating and controlling them differs from case to case. Thus, for example, the European Parliament has its representatives on the management boards of few agencies while it is not even mentioned in the establishment acts of others. The need to create a common framework for operation of and controlling regulatory agencies was stressed several times by the Commission since 2001. These attempts have seen no result. This research project aims to investigate this topic; however, the research focus will be narrowed down to the question: whether and how the European Parliament can and should control European agencies. To answer the question it is necessary to investigate what possibilities exist for parliaments to exercise control over independent agencies. This leads us to look at national experiences. Though it would be perhaps most logical to turn to member states to gain such knowledge, the analysis of the situation there shows that due to the restrictions of ministerial responsibility concept the majority of member states experiences some problems themselves in controlling these bodies. The US, the birthplace of independent agencies, on the other hand, might offer some valuable knowledge in that respect. Therefore, the US has been selected as a case-study to learn and to compare. This four-year Ph.D. project, funded by the Montesquieu Institute, has started in 2008 and is carried out by Mira Scholten.
The Investigative Powers of the European Parliament
The European Union seems to suffer from an accountability deficit. The European Parliament is generally considered too weak and unable to play a significant role to effectively hold EU executive bodies accountable. This raises the question as to whether its investigative powers, its right of inquiry (art. 193 EC Treaty) in particular, should be strengthened, in order to address the EU’s apparent accountability deficit. Based on a comparison of national systems, those of Germany and France in particular, the research will advance recommendations to further develop the European Parliaments investigative powers, thereby strengthening the accountability of the European Union. This four-year Ph.D. project, funded by the Montesquieu Institute, has started in 2008 and is carried out by Christian Syrier.
Parliamentary Investigations in a Comparative Perspective
Faced with growing concerns over executive dominance and increasing awareness of the need for proper mechanisms to hold the government to account, the Dutch parliament began to experiment with parliamentary committees of investigation in the early 1980s. Almost three decades later, parliamentary investigations have become an established part of parliamentary procedure. This research project consists of a comparative study of the procedures and practices of parliamentary investigations of three national parliaments, i.e. the Netherlands Parliament, the U.K. Parliament and the U.S. Congress. It attempts to analyse which investigative powers these parliaments have and how they are applied within their respective constitutional contexts. This may result in recommendations for improving the Dutch parliament’s ability to hold the executive branch to account. This five-year Ph.D. project, funded by Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law, has started in 2005 and is carried out by Sandor Loeffen.
